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Introduction 
 
 
The aim of this work is to describe some of the major contributions to the theory of 
oligopoly with free entry, tracing the evolutionary phases and clarifying the 
interconnections between different models. In particular we will first analyze the starting 
contributions of the 1950’s which gave rise to the so-called limit pricing theory; then we 
will introduce the role of capacity in deterring entry; finally we will analyze a model with 
incomplete information in which both established and potential firms are not fully 
informed about others’ cost functions. 
Oligopoly is a market structure characterized by the fact that industry is dominated by a 
small number of firms, each one possessing market power, i.e. the ability to alter 
profitably prices away from competitive levels. In such situation, the action of one firm 
can alter not only its own profitability, but also the one of the others and vice-versa. 
Therefore, competition among firms in oligopolistic market is inherently a setting of 
strategic interaction: each firm recognizes that its profit depends not only on its own 
action, but also on the action of the others. For this reason, the appropriate tool for the 
analysis of competition among oligopolistic firms is game theory. And indeed the models 
we will analyze are essentially games, each one characterized by a set of players, a 
structure, and one or many equilibria. 
In the games we are going to analyze, competition takes place between actual (or 
established, or incumbent) firms and potential (or prospective entrant) ones. For the sake 
of simplicity we will assume the existence of just one established firm and one 
prospective entrant. Such simplification does not alter the basic results of the models: one 
might consider one established firm as collusive cooperation among oligopolistic firms; 
on the opposite side, 𝑛 identical prospective entrant firms can be represented just as one 
firm, supplying  𝑛 times the amount of output. 
Since entry takes time, these games are characterized by many stages. At the first stage, 
established firms recognize that new firms want to enter the market (i.e. they recognize 
the threat of entry); hence they can try to discourage the entry of new firms by affecting 
their profitability perception of industry. At the second stage, prospective entrant firms 
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make their entry decision observing the action of the first stage. Finally, if they decide to 
enter, firms compete under some rule.  
This is the basic structure of static models, which will be subjects of our analysis; 
however, since the 1970’s many authors examined the problem of entry in oligopolistic 
markets in a dynamic setting, exactly because entry is matter of time. The most famous 
contributions in this context are the ones of Wenders (1970), Kamien and Schwartz 
(1971) and Gaskins (1971). 
For what concerns the rule of post-entry game, one might assume a quantity-setting 
oligopoly (Cournot game), a price setting oligopoly (Bertrand – Edgeworth game) or, 
why not, a product differentiation oligopoly (Hotelling game). Here we will deal with 
models in which firms compete à la Cournot. Hence, oligopolistic firms are supposed to 
manage the quantity of the good produced and sold, with the price determined by the 
aggregate output of industry. Another assumption is that both actual and potential firms 
produce homogeneous goods; that is the goods produced by firms are assumed to be 
perfect substitutes.  
The effect of product differentiation on the possibilities of entry in oligopolistic markets 
is a matter that deserves a careful and separate analysis. Here we would like to emphasize 
two opposite observations: the one, according to Bain, for which product differentiation 
implies a barrier to entry in the sense that the producer of one brand cannot replicate 
another brand without incurring a disadvantage in either cost of sales; the other, according 
to Dixit, for which entry prevention is more difficult when products are poorer substitutes, 
since differentiation reduces the effect of output policy of one firm on others’ profits; in 
the limiting case where products are perceived completely different by buyers the action 
of one firm would have no effect on the others. 
According to game theory approach, the solutions of the models take the form of Nash 
equilibria. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a situation in which no one can do better by 
unilaterally changing his or her strategy; where a strategy for each player is defined as 
the set of action chosen at each stage (i.e. at each information set) of the game. In our 
context, a Nash equilibrium will be a situation where no firm can increase its profit by 
unilaterally changing its output policy. Moreover, as the games we are going to analyze 
are typically composed by many stages, for the models with complete information we 
will find Nash equilibria of each game using backward induction. However, when we 
will analyze the model with incomplete information, where players are not fully informed 
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about some feature of the game, then backward induction will not allow us to any 
equilibrium. Indeed in case of uncertainty, players rely on their beliefs and the right 
solution concept to adopt will be the perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium.  
The notion of entry barrier, almost whispered above, has a precise meaning and a very 
special role in oligopoly theory: its determination defines the starting point for the study 
on the implication of entry in oligopolistic markets. In such situation, established firms 
can strategically erect entry barriers by lowering their price, with the purpose to deter 
entry, if they expect that the entry of a new firm will reduce substantially their profits: 
this is the essence of the limit pricing theory. 
Such theory - born in the 1950’s with the contributions of Bain, Sylos Labini and 
Modigliani - arose with the purpose to explain why monopolists or oligopolists with 
effective collusion on price, set prices lower than the profit-maximizing level at which 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. According to Bain, Sylos Labini and Modigliani, 
established firms lowered their price in order to reduce the demand faced by prospective 
entrant firms (i.e. the residual demand). The assumption behind such intuition consisted 
in the fact that the established firms, facing the threat of entry, would have maintained 
fixed the level of output. Such assumption - named Sylos’ postulate - was really 
restrictive, since in some cases an accommodating reduction of output in face of new 
entry could have generated greater profits than the ones resulting from the sustaining of 
the fixed amount of output. Such clever considerations remained without a satisfactory 
answer until the contribution of Dixit in the 1980’s who completed and clarified the basic 
intuition behind limit pricing theory introducing capacity variable. Through an 
irreversible pre-commitment investment on capacity at the stage when entry is threatened, 
incumbent firms are able to give credibility to their behavior of sustaining the amount of 
output consistent with low prices. After Dixit’s contribution the theory acquired 
consistency, with the consequent desertion of Sylos’ postulate. 
Another way for justifying the behavior of setting low prices in order to deter entry -  
without assuming Sylos’ postulate - was provided by Milgrom and Roberts two years 
later Dixit’s work. In a context where both actual and potential firms ignore rival’s 
constant marginal cost, they demonstrated that established firms might set prices lower 
than the profit-maximizing one in order to fool the entrants, signaling a high degree of 
competitiveness that they really do not have. Such degree of competitiveness is enclosed 
in the value of firms’ marginal cost, which in turn affect the amount of output and price 
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level. Such strategy, as we will see, can constitute an equilibrium strategy for incumbent 
firms, in perfect harmony with limit pricing theory approach.  
Milgrom and Roberts’ strengthened the theory of limit pricing by which established firms 
can strategically erect barrier to entry by lowering their price, extending such behavior 
also in a context of incomplete information.  The analysis of their contribution concludes 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
GENESIS OF ENTRY BARRIER 
LITERATURE 
1.1 Introduction  
The starting point for the study of entry barriers dates back to the year 1956 when two 
authors, Joe Bain and Paolo Sylos Labini, published “Barriers to new competition” and 
“Oligopolio e progresso tecnologico” respectively. Some year later (1958), Franco 
Modigliani formalized the basic results of Bain-Sylos’ analysis in his brilliant paper “New 
development on the oligopoly front”, which can be rightly considered  a fundamental 
work in entry-barriers literature which was taken in consideration by future authors who 
faced the problem of entry in oligopolistic markets.  
Precisely in Bain’s work we can find the first notion of entry barrier in economic 
literature, defined as “an advantage of established sellers over potential entrant sellers, 
which is reflected in the extent to which established sellers can persistently raise their 
prices above competitive levels without attracting new firms to enter the industry” (Bain 
1956, p. 3). Afterwards, with the consequent development of the research on entry 
barriers, other authors proposed different definitions.  Indeed Stigler (1968, p. 67) offered 
an alternative definition based on cost asymmetries between incumbent and entrant firms, 
qualifying “entry barriers as cost that must be borne by a firm that seeks to enter an 
industry but is not borne by firms already in the industry”. According to this approach 
Von Weizsacker (1980, p. 400) later emphasized welfare effects of such asymmetries, 
which should imply also “a distortion in the allocation of resources from the social point 
of view”. 
By those definitions, entry barriers arise whenever established firms possess an 
advantage, or, according to Modigliani, a premium over prospective entrant firms; such 
premium, according to Bain, allows incumbent firms to sustain a price greater than 
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average total cost (which includes the normal remuneration from business investment) 
without inducing entry; on the other hand Stigler pointed out the existence of a 
competitive advantage over the entrants in terms of additional costs that potential firms 
have to pay if they want to come into a market characterized by entry barriers. Surely 
there is a common factor in both definitions; that is, entry is harder in markets with entry 
barriers. 
The fact that entry may indeed be free - which means by definition that there are no 
physical, monopolistic, or financial obstacles to prevent the entry of new capacity - does 
not necessarily means also that it is easy, as Edwards (1955, p. 95) pointed out:  
“Consider first the case of Perfect Competition. Here indeed the 
presumption is that there is both freedom and ease of entry. The 
problems confronting the prospective new entrant, therefore, are 
of a different order as compared with the case of perfect 
competition. The new entrant in manufacturing industry has not 
only to establish his production unit; he has also to acquire the 
essential connexion in the market, which is the condition sine qua 
non of his efficient and continuing manufacture. In this sense 
entry, while free, is not easy.”1 
However Edwards was far away from giving a definition of entry barriers. His 
considerations should be viewed in the context of criticism in accordance with Harrod’s 
critique of the “accepted doctrine” of imperfect competition for which conditions of 
imperfect competition with free entry regularly give rise to creation of excess capacity. 
This leads us even further back in time, around the 1930’s, and inside the debate of 
imperfect competition with free entry started with the two books of Chamberlin (1933) 
and Robinson (1933), afterwards developed in a critical way by Kaldor (1935). 
Now, the basic result of the theory of imperfect competition with free entry is the 
following: under certain assumptions, long-run equilibrium is such that price equals the 
long-run average cost of industry. In this context there are two opposite views: in the first, 
supported by Kaldor, and in perfect harmony with Chamberlin and Robinson, entry in 
imperfect competitive markets induces inefficiencies and the arising of excess capacity 
in long-run equilibrium; the second, proposed by Harrod (1952), according to which 
                                                          
1 In particular Edwards referred to the goodwill business acquired by established firms with their clients, 
meaning that buyers, especially of intermediate product, tend to look first to their customary suppliers 
because of the confidence gained by previous customs. As a consequence, buyers might take time to change 
their suppliers (even offering the product at a low cost), and in order to reduce this time-lag entrant firm 
may have to incur in high advertising expenditures. In this context the entrant is forced to sustain in 
additional costs, and this reminds to the definition of entry barriers given by Stigler years later. 
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established firms plan to charge a price yielding only normal profit in order to limit the 
entry of new firms, without creating excess capacity.  
The recognition that established firms could react to potential competitors by lowering 
their prices was crucial in order to emphasize the relation between conditions of entry and 
equilibrium price of industries. The study of such relation arose in the 1950’s from the 
contributions of Bain (1949, 1956), Harrod (1952), Edwards (1955), Lydall (1955)2, 
Sylos Labini (1957)3 and Modigliani (1958): all of them, in different ways, focused on 
the definition of the entry-deterring equilibrium price level. 
However the works of Bain, Sylos Labini and Modigliani were a breaking point with the 
previous literature. Indeed Harrod, but also Edwards and Lydall, demonstrated that the 
level of price that did not induce the entry of new firms should have been equal to the 
minimum value of long-run average cost function; on the contrary Bain, Sylos Labini and 
Modigliani provided the possibility of long-run equilibrium where price were charged 
above long-run average total cost, and where established firms could earn extra-profits 
without inducing entry4.  
The works of Bain, Sylos Labini and Modigliani were quoted jointly by the subsequent 
authors who faced the problem of entry barriers as the Bain-Sylos Labini-Modigliani 
model (B-S-M model): it represented the first step towards the application of game theory 
and strategic behavior to oligopoly with free entry, giving rise to the limit pricing theory.5 
In their critical review to Modigliani’s paper, Farrar and Phillips (1959) and Fisher (1959) 
emphasized the analogy between B-S-M model and classical Cournot model; in particular 
Fisher (1959, p. 413) noted that: “the true analogy, of course, is with a Cournot 
“leadership” model, with all firms already in the industry playing the collective leader to 
the potential entrant’s follower.” Essentially Fisher referred to the Stackelberg (1934) 
oligopoly model, and he was right. In fact Osborne (1973) later demonstrated that the B-
                                                          
2 Lydall (1955) introduced the concept of “no-entry price ceiling” as “the maximum price which can be 
charged without provoking new entry”, corresponding to the level at which, under the hypothesis of firms 
with identical cost curves, price “lies at the minimum point of each firm’s long-run average cost (including 
normal profits) curve.” 
3 Here we refer to the first Italian edition of Sylos Labini’s work; however, a first provisional version dates 
back to 1956. This last version was later taken into account by Modigliani (Cfr. Rancan 2012). 
4 Recalling the definition suggested by Bain, entry barriers arise precisely from the “extent to which 
established sellers can persistently raise their prices above competitive levels without attracting new firms 
to enter the industry”. 
5 The name derives from the concept of limit price introduced by Bain (1949). Limit pricing is a strategy 
that consists in setting a price low enough to make entry unprofitable (i.e. the limit price). For a clear 
explanation of limit pricing strategy Cfr. 1.4; for the definition of limit price Cfr.  1.3.2. 
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S-M model gives rise exactly to the Stackelberg equilibrium, at least when entry 
effectively occurs.  
Hence, there is a double connection between the microeconomic studies of the 1930’s 
and the emerging theory of entry barriers of the 1950’s. First, there exists a link with the 
theory of imperfect competition through Harrod’s principles, as Osborne (1973, p. 71) 
pointed out:  
”The theory of limit pricing had its genesis in a suggestion  of 
Harrod that firms in monopolistically competitive markets might 
not reach the tangency solution of Chamberlin (with its implied 
excess capacity) but might rather set a price lower than the 
tangency price so as to discourage the entrance of new 
competitors”.  
Second, the B-S-M model gives rise to the equilibrium provided by Stackelberg, with 
incumbents acting as the leader firms, and the potential entrants as the follower firms. 
In this chapter first we will describe the debate around the theory of imperfect 
competition; then we will show Modigliani’s synthesis of Bain-Sylos Labini analysis, 
with an extension proposed by Bhagwati (1970) who included the goodwill business 
introduced by Edwards; finally we will expose the B-S-M model as a duopoly model, and 
the reaching of Stackelberg equilibrium. 
1.2 Entry in the theory of Imperfect Competition 
1.2.1 Equilibrium and Excess Capacity 
Perfectly competitive markets are characterized by the following basic assumptions: firms 
produce homogeneous goods, i.e. the goods are perfect substitutes each other; firms are 
price-takers since they act as an infinitesimal element in relation to the industry; the 
market is open, without any entry or exit costs; there is perfect information in the 
economy. Hence, in perfect competitive markets, the demand curve facing each firm is 
horizontal, i.e. elasticity of every individual demand is infinite. 
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On the contrary, the starting point in the theory of Imperfect Competition is the 
proposition that firms are confronted with a downward sloping demand curve. Its 
development dates back to 1933 when E.H. Chamberlin and J. Robinson published 
respectively “The theory of Monopolistic Competition” and “The theory of Imperfect 
Competition”, and it has been subsequently developed critically by N. Kaldor (1935). 
The theory is based on four basic assumptions. First, it is assumed that there is a large 
number of independent firms that produce and sell only one product which is, in Kaldor’s 
words, slightly different from the products of other firms; that is, firms’ products are 
sufficiently different each other but at the same time similar enough to be considered 
substitutes, but not perfect substitutes.  This implies that a firm, lowering the price of its 
own good, will attract some but not all others’ costumers.6 Hence each firm faces an 
individual demand related to its differentiated product. 
Second, it is assumed that consumers’ preferences are fairly evenly distributed among 
different varieties; and since there is a large number of firms, “any adjustment of price or 
of product by a single producer spreads its influence over so many of his competitors that 
the impact felt by any one is negligible and does not lead him to any readjustment of his 
own situation” (Chamberlin 1933, p. 83). 
Third, the long-run cost curves of all producers are assumed to be falling up to a certain 
rate of output; in other words, it is assumed that up to a certain output, there are 
“economies of scale”. Moreover the elasticities of demand curves and the cost curves of 
each producer are also assumed to be the same. 
Finally, it is assumed that no producer possesses an institutional monopoly over any of 
the varieties produced (in forms of licenses or patents), and thus the entry of new 
producers into the field in general and every portion of it is free and unimpeded. 
Thus, we have a market with many firms; each one is characterized by the same cost 
function and faces an individual demand curve, due to the possibility to produce slightly 
different goods; moreover individual demands have the same elasticities. In order to 
maximize its profit, each firm produces the quantity consistent with the intersection 
between marginal revenue and marginal cost curves; and since marginal revenue curve is 
lower than individual demand, each firm earns extra-profit, i.e. profit above the normal 
                                                          
6 Technically this means that the cross-elasticity of demand of the goods, i.e. the elasticity of demand of 
one good with respect to others’ price variation is not infinite. 
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level. Such extra-profits will attract new firms into the market. The increased supply 
thereby generated tends to reduce the price at which each and every firm can market a 
given volume of output of this kind; the particular demand curve confronting each such 
firm is pushed to the left and its marginal revenue curve too; this process continues until 
surplus profits are eliminated and with it the stimulus of new entrants. In this equilibrium 
position each firm, or perhaps we should say, the representative firm, makes no more than 
normal profit. In the positions of final equilibrium, not only marginal cost will be equal 
to marginal revenue, but average cost will also be equal to price, that is demand curve 
will be tangential to the cost curve. This process is described in figure 1. 
 
FIG 1 – The adjustment process under imperfect competition. (Source: Edwards 1955, p. 103) 
Suppose that, in the initial position there is only one firm in the market, facing demand 
curve 𝑑. It produces the quantity 𝑀2, at which marginal revenue equals marginal cost, 
and charges the price 𝑃2, earning extra-profit. Such situation attracts new firms in the 
market; with the entry of new competitors, demand curve faced by established firm shifts 
to the left, say at 𝑑′. In such situation firms still earn extra-profits, and new firms will 
enter the market. Hence the equilibrium situation will be at 𝐵 (the so called tangency 
solution), where price level is 𝑃4, individual demand is tangent to long-run average cost 
curve, and marginal revenue equals marginal cost. During the process, firms act as short-
run profit maximizers and accommodate entry of new firms. Moreover, at the final 
equilibrium, prices remain higher than the perfect competitive level, i.e. higher than the 
minimum value of long-run average cost, and production is inefficient. Indeed firms are 
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not producing in an efficient way, since their scale of production is lower than the one 
consistent with minimum of long-run average cost function, that is 𝑀1. Hence, excess 
capacity is observed in long-run equilibrium. 
Now, one might first argue on the validity of the basic assumptions stated above, in 
particular their correspondence to the real world, as Kaldor himself did7. In this context 
his considerations on the divisibility assumption are of great interest. Indeed in the theory 
of imperfect competition, it is implicitly assumed that capital is perfectly divisible; that 
is, production plant can always be reduced when a reduction of output is demanded. 
Removing this assumption means that a certain scale of production is required in order to 
recover fixed cost of the indivisible plant. In this case, there is no reason to assume that it 
will stop precisely at the point where the demand and cost curves are tangent, as Kaldor 
(1935, p. 42) pointed out: 
“On account of the very reason of economies of scale, the 
potential producer cannot hope to enter the field profitably with 
less than a certain magnitude of output; thus the additional output 
may reduce demand, both to his nearest neighbors and to him, to 
such an extent that the demand curves will lie below the cost 
curves and all will be involved in losses. The same reason 
therefore which prevents competition from becoming perfect, i.e. 
indivisible, will also prevent the complete elimination of profits. 
It will secure a “monopolistic advantage” to anybody who is first 
in the field and merely by virtue of priority. Hence, indivisibility 
of capital acts as a protective shield against introducers.” 
                                                          
7 He argued for example that, even if it is quite reasonable to assume that the products in an industry are 
slightly different, there is no reason why the cross-elasticity of demands should be equal over the different 
products. This is of great importance for reaching final equilibrium, since in this case adjustment of price 
or of “product” by a single producer will spread its influence evenly over all his competitors. However 
Kaldor (1935, pp. 38-39) stressed the fact that  
“Pseudo-monopolists thus cannot be grouped together in a lump but can at best 
be placed into a series. Each product can be conceived as occupying a certain 
position on a scale; the scale being so constructed that those products are 
neighboring each other between which the consumers’ elasticity of substitution 
is the greatest. Each producer then is faced on each side with his nearest rivals; 
the demand for his own product will be most sensitive with respect to the prices 
of these; less and less sensitive as one moves further away from him.” 
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These considerations sound like a premonition of what Bain-Modigliani provided twenty 
years later, that is entry barriers emerge in industries characterized by economies of 
scale.8 
1.2.2 Harrod’s Critics 
Given the assumptions, the theory has been considered unassailable until the contribution 
of R.F. Harrod, “The theory of imperfect competition revised”, published in “Economic 
Essays” in 1952. He fully criticized the process according to which firms behave naively, 
maximizing their profits regardless of the possibility of entry of new firms with, as final 
result, the creation of excess capacity.  
First, Harrod discussed an implicit assumption of the theory concerning fixed costs. 
Indeed, it was assumed that fixed equipment is an unalterable datum, having been created 
by each firm once and for all in a remote past, when the present was largely uncertain. 
On the contrary, Harrod pointed out that typically fixed equipment have been created step 
by step: at every stage, careful considerations were required in order to evaluate benefits 
and costs of an investment. And in this context, surely firms would consider the 
possibility of entry of new firms. 
Now recall figure 1 and assume that firms invest in fixed capital as Harrod described. 
Here the problem is the following: if the firms foresee the trend of events, i.e. that new 
firms will enter in the market and that the final long-run equilibrium will be at 𝐵, why not 
plan to have a plant that will produce output level 𝑀4 most cheaply, rather than incur in 
excess capacity? But in that case (as shown in the figure by the low long-run marginal 
cost curve), firms will continue to earn extra-profits; then 𝐵 will no more be an 
equilibrium, new firms will enter in the market, and a new equilibrium will be reached; 
the output of each firm will reduce with the creation of excess capacity (as before). 
On the other side, Harrod emphasized the fact that established firms typically are not 
willing to sacrifice markets available to them for the sake of fleeting extra-profit, since 
“such sacrifice will tend to make them weaker in facing the various contingencies of an 
                                                          
8 Cfr. Par. 1.3. 
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unforeseeable future”. Such considerations acquire consistency on the assumption that 
firms are profit-maximizers in Robinson’s sense: 
“the most valid simple generalisation is that the aim of the 
entrepreneur is for the firm first to survive, and secondly to 
growth. To this end he must pursue profit, but he must avoid 
action which, though profitable in the present, will damage his 
future position[…]”. (Robinson 1933, p. 582) 
If firms behave as described by Chamberlin and Kaldor, they pursue profits, but they do 
not avoid action which will damage their future position. Hence, established firms might 
apply an output/price policy in order to discourage entry, securing their future position. 
So long as established firms set prices higher than long-run average cost, the resulting 
extra-profits will attract new firms in the market. Thus, in order to limit entry, established 
firm must charge a price according to which they will earn only normal profits: 
“The conclusion is that, if there is free or relatively free entry, the 
entrepreneur […] will plan to charge a price yielding only normal 
profit, save to the extent that he is aware of possessing an 
advantage peculiar to himself, will plan to have equipment on a 
scale that gives the lowest cost for producing what he can sell at 
such a price, and, having acquired the equipment, will sell at that 
price, even although the short-period marginal revenue yielded by 
such a policy is less than the marginal cost. The equipment 
required for this policy will be larger and the price charged lower, 
and nearer, the social optimum that those entailed by “accepted 
doctrine”. (Harrod 1952, p. 151) 
Therefore, unless established firm has a cost advantage over potential competitors, 
equilibrium described by Harrod is point 𝐴 in figure 1. In such situation, established firm 
earns just normal-profit, since price equal average cost, without attracting new firms in 
the market. Production is efficient and equilibrium price is lower than the one proposed 
by Chamberlin and Kaldor. 
The theory of imperfect competition remains, anyway, controversial. On one hand it says 
essentially that free entry, which typically means more competition, induces inefficient 
production and high prices; on the other hand, if such entry is impeded by established 
firm, i.e. the industry remains highly concentrated, then price is low and production is 
efficient. Hence entry is supposed to have a clear positive effect in the market only by the 
influence to established firms that are induced to reduce the price, at least as long as they 
believe in Harrod’s principles. 
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However, Harrod has been the first in providing an output/price policy intentionally 
directed to discourage entry of new firms and consistent with the objective of firms to be 
profit-maximizing. A strategy, this one, that can be considered the genesis of limit pricing 
strategy started with Bain-Sylos Labini-Modigliani’s model. 
1.3 Modigliani’s Synthesis  
1.3.1 Entry and Sylos’ Postulate 
The entry of new firms occurs when potential entrants expect to earn nonnegative profits 
once they will join industry competition9. Firms’ profits are nonnegative if equilibrium 
price level is greater than or equal to their average total costs. Therefore potential entrant 
firms will enter the market if they expect that equilibrium price level after entry - i.e. the 
price generated by the increased aggregate output -  will be higher than or at least equal 
to their average total cost. Hence established price level, i.e. the price policy actually set 
by established firms, has no meaning for them, since “even if the pre-entry price is above 
the lowest achievable cost, the additional output proposed to sell by the entrant may drive 
price below cost, making entry unprofitable” (Modigliani, 1958).  
The price after entry is determined both by the entry decisions of potential firms and by 
the reaction of incumbents in response to the threat of entry. Thus, the effect of entry on 
equilibrium price level is the result of the interactions between existing firms and potential 
ones; and such interactions could also leave equilibrium price unchanged. Indeed consider 
the case of an industry with homogeneous firms, i.e. firms with the same technology, 
which compete on quantities facing a downward sloping aggregate demand curve. If the 
additional output of entrant firm reduces the price below the lowest cost achievable in the 
industry, then established firms may react to the threat of entry contracting the quantity 
                                                          
9 Indeed if potential entrant can earn extra-profit or normal profit: in this sense costs include the normal 
remuneration for shareholder as an opportunity cost. Moreover it is assumed that there are no other 
possibilities of investment for potential entrant firm that could earn positive profits.  
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produced and sold: in the limiting case the aggregate quantity supplied may be the same 
and the price may be completely unaffected.  
In order to solve this impasse Modigliani proposed an assumption - the so called Sylos’ 
postulate - for which potential entrants behave as though they expected existing firms to 
adopt the policy of maintaining output while reducing the price, in order to find a well-
defined solution to the problem of long-run price and output under homogeneous 
oligopoly with possibility of entry10. Under Sylos’ postulate pre-entry price has a 
commitment value due to the fact that established firms are supposed to sustain the fixed 
level of production. Hence pre-entry price assumes a relevance for prospective entrant 
firms, since they know with certainty that equilibrium price level after entry will be lower 
than pre-entry price due to the increased aggregate output. The postulate was very 
powerful and it was always assumed until Dixit’s work in 1980. 
Modigliani’s analysis can be divided into two parts: in the first one the author followed 
Bain’s approach considering the case of an industry in which firms must produce a 
quantity greater than a certain amount in order to make positive profits; while, in the 
second part, Modigliani left such assumption providing the possibility for firms to be 
profitable at any quantity of output greater than zero. We will analyze the market for a 
homogeneous good, thus it is assumed that goods produced by both actual and potential 
firms are perfect substitutes; moreover Sylos’ postulate applies. 
1.3.2 The Model with Minimum Profitable Scale 
Let us assume for simplicity that there is one established firm already operating in a 
market as a monopolist and one prospective entrant firm. Firms are homogeneous and 
produce goods that are perfect substitutes.11 Moreover firms are characterized by convex 
long-run average cost functions, i.e. there exists a scale of output which is optimal in the 
sense that it is consistent with the minimum point of long-run average cost curves. 
Formally: 
                                                          
10 “If the firm or firms that are in a position to set the price aim to prevent the entry of new firms of a certain 
type, they must keep the price to a level below that which ensures to such firms the minimum rate of profit” 
(Sylos Labini, 1956) 
11 Hence this is essentially a pure duopoly. 
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∃?̅? > 0  |  𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶(?̅?) < 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶(𝑥), ∀𝑥 ≠ ?̅? 
Where 𝑥 is the output level and 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶(𝑥) is long-run average cost function. 
Let 𝑋 = 𝐷(𝑃) be the negatively sloped aggregate demand function for the homogeneous 
good and 𝑃(𝑋) ≡ 𝐷−1(𝑋) the corresponding inverse aggregate demand function. Define 
𝑃′ as the equilibrium pre-entry price and 𝑋′ = 𝐷(𝑃′) the aggregate demand satisfied by 
monopolistic firm. By the existence of Sylos’ postulate, established firm’s output is 
assumed to be fixed for every amount of output supplied by the potential entrant; therefore 
entrant firm must deal with the residual demand curve, that is with the segment of 
aggregate demand curve to the right of 𝑃′. If it enters and supplies a certain positive 
quantity of output 𝑥𝑒, then aggregate supply becomes  𝑋
′ + 𝑥𝑒 and equilibrium price 
decreases: potential entrant will come into the market only if 𝑃(𝑋′ + 𝑥𝑒) ≥ 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑒).  
Every pre-entry price that does not induce entry is said to be an entry-preventing price. 
In this context, if pre-entry price 𝑃′ is such that the corresponding marginal demand curve 
is everywhere below entrant firm’s long-run average total cost. Thus 𝑃′ is an entry-
preventing price since entry is unprofitable, as there does not exist any 𝑥𝑒 > 0 such that 
𝑃(𝑋′ + 𝑥𝑒) ≥ 𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶(𝑥𝑒). 
 
FIG 2 – An example of pre-entry price which is also an entry-preventing price 
Under the definition of entry barriers proposed by Bain (1956), established firms’ 
advantage over prospective entrants is reflected in the extent to which it is possible to 
sustain prices above competitive levels without inducing entry; hence, in order to define 
such extent, we have to focus on the highest entry-preventing price, i.e. the so-called limit 
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price.12 Let 𝑃0 be such critical price and 𝑋0 = 𝐷(𝑃0)  the corresponding aggregate 
demand (i.e. the lowest entry-preventing output): the heart of Modigliani’s analysis 
consisted in finding the factors that determine 𝑃0.  
In order to explore those factors controlling 𝑃0, denote with ?̅? the optimum scale of firms’ 
output, that is the scale of output consistent with the lowest point of the long-run average 
cost, and let 𝑐̅ be the corresponding minimum level of average cost. Denoting with 𝑃𝑐 the 
perfect competitive price, in perfect competition we have 𝑃𝑐 = 𝑐̅ and the corresponding 
output 𝑋𝑐 = 𝐷(𝑃𝑐) = 𝐷(𝑐̅). 
Modigliani defined the size of market 𝑆 as the ratio between competitive output and 
optimum scale: 
𝑆 =
𝑋𝑐
?̅?
 [1.1] 
Following Bain’s analysis, Modigliani considered the case where industry’s technology 
is such that, if firms produce at scale lower than firms’ optimum scale ?̅?, they are not able 
to earn positive profits13; thus, entrant firm can only supply at a scale equal to or larger 
than ?̅?. In this case entry is profitable if the aggregate output when entrant firm supplies 
the minimum profitable output level  is no greater than perfect competitive output, i.e. if 
𝑋′ + ?̅? ≤ 𝑋𝑐. Hence any ?̃? such that ?̃? + ?̅? > 𝑋𝑐 is an entry-preventing output. Therefore, 
critical output level 𝑋0 must be such that if a firm enters the market supplying the 
minimum profitable scale ?̅?, then aggregate output equals perfect competitive output, i.e. 
𝑋0 + ?̅? = 𝑋𝑐 : if  𝑋′ < 𝑋0 then entry is attractive since 𝑋
′ + ?̅? < 𝑋𝑐, while if 𝑋
′ > 𝑋0 
then entry is unattractive since 𝑋′ + ?̅? > 𝑋𝑐. Hence we get 
𝑋0 = 𝑋𝑐 − ?̅? = 𝑋𝑐 (1 −
?̅?
𝑋𝑐
) = 𝑋𝑐 (1 −
1
𝑆
). [1.2] 
Generally speaking, the higher is the value of 𝑋0, the greater is the set of pre-entry output 
levels that make entry attractive. But 𝑋0 depends negatively on the level of ?̅?, i.e. on 
minimum level of profitable production scale. This means that entry is more difficult in 
an industry characterized by high fixed costs, in which economies of scale are incisive in 
                                                          
12 Bain (1949) first introduced the concept of limit price, defined as “the highest common price which the 
established sellers believe they can charge without inducing at least one increment to entry – presumably a 
significant lump increment”. 
13 It can happen, for instance, in presence of sunk cost. 
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the sense that firms need to produce a large amount of output in order to be profitable. 
Thus, the incisiveness of economies of scale reduces the possibility to entry in the market. 
Looking at [1.2] we find the relation between critical aggregate output and size of the 
market. Specifically, 𝑋0 is positively influenced by 𝑆, 14 hence the size of the market 
influences positively the possibility to entry in the market. 
Alternatively, Modigliani introduced the following (approximated) relation between 𝑃0 
and 𝑃𝑐 in terms of the elasticity of demand in the neighborhood of 𝑃𝑐: 
𝑃0 ≃ 𝑃𝑐 (1 +
1
𝜂𝑆
), [1.3] 
from which we can see the negative relation between critical price 𝑃0 and elasticity of 
demand;  thus elasticity of demand increases the possibility to entry in the market.15 
1.3.3 The general case 
After that, Modigliani replaced the very special cost function assumed so far with the 
more conventional one, falling more or less gradually up to ?̅?, and  providing the 
possibility for a firm to be profitable at a scale of production lower than ?̅?. In this case, 
even at a level of output equal to 𝑋0, it may be profitable for a prospective entrant firm to 
come into the market with a scale smaller than ?̅?. This possibility and its implication can 
be analyzed with the following graphic apparatus proposed by the author. 
                                                          
14 𝑋0 = 𝑋𝑐 (
𝑆−1
𝑆
)  therefore  
𝜕𝑋0
𝜕𝑆
= 𝑋𝑐
1
𝑆2
> 0 thus 𝑋0 is an increasing function of 𝑆. 
15 Quantity demanded is a negative function of price. Then if 𝑃0decreases, 𝑋0 raises, making entry easier. 
23 
 
 
    FIG 3 – Determination of 𝑃0 with both different demand and cost functions.  
(Source: Modigliani 1958, p. 219) 
In panels IA and IIA, the light lines falling from the left to the right are two different 
market demand curves. For the sake of simplicity optimal scale output ?̅? and the 
corresponding minimum long-run average cost value 𝑐̅ are respectively the unit of 
measurement of output 𝑋 and price 𝑃. Therefore we have that 𝑃𝑐 = 𝑐̅ = 1 and 𝑆 = 𝑋𝑐 
since ?̅? = 1. Thus panel IA relates to an industry of size 2 while IIA to an industry of size 
10.  
The two heavy lines in each of the two panels represent alternative cost curves16. Because 
of the choice of unit, each curve represents long-run average cost curve in percentage of 
minimum level 𝑘 as a function of output in percentage of optimum scale ?̅?. Hence they 
describe the following relation: 
𝐿𝑅𝐴𝐶
𝑐̅
= 𝑓 (
𝑋
?̅?
). [1.3] 
                                                          
16 More specifically they are the branch of cost curves up to their minimum point. 
24 
 
The steeper of these two curves is the kind of cost function that underlies Bain’s analysis 
and involves marked economies of scale17; while, the other one, involving less 
pronounced economies of scale, depicts the kind of cost function that underlies Sylos’ 
numerical examples. 
The critical price and output (𝑃0, 𝑋0) can be found sliding the cost curve to the right 
parallel to itself, together with its co-ordinate axis, until no points of this curve lies inside 
demand curve. This step is illustrated in panels IB, IIB and IC, IIC for the two kinds of 
cost curves. The point at which the Y –axis so displaced cuts the demand curve represents 
𝑃0; the point at which it cuts the X –axis is 𝑋0.
18 The portion of demand curve on the right 
of the axis so displaced is exactly the marginal demand curve faced by prospective entrant 
firm when pre-entry output is 𝑋0. 
Let us analyze the panels of the figure above. First, by comparing panel IB with IC and 
IIB with IIC we can see that, for a given market size, 𝑃0 tends to be higher the steeper the 
cost curve, i.e. the greatest the economies of scale. Similarly, by comparing IB with IIB 
and IC with IIC, for a given cost curve and elasticity of demand, 𝑃0 tends to fall with the 
size of the market; moreover, for a given size of the market, since a higher elasticity of 
demand implies a rotation counter-clockwise around competitive point, it appears that a 
higher elasticity acts in the same direction of market size, that is it will tend to lower 𝑃0.  
Therefore, since a higher level of 𝑃0 means a lower possibility to enter the market, also 
in absence of a minimum profitable scale, “there is a well-defined maximum premium 
that the oligopolist can command over the competitive price, and this premium tends to 
increase with the importance of economies of scale and to decrease with the size of the 
market and the elasticity of demand” (Modigliani, 1958). 
 
 
                                                          
17 In the sense that the amount of output produced has a significant effect on reducing long-run average 
cost. 
18 Indeed imagine to slide cost curve a little bit more on the right; then, no points of long-run average cost 
curve lies below demand. Therefore there will be no possibilities of positive profits for new entrant. 
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1.3.4 An Extension 
Thanks to Bhagwati (1970) we can extend the relation written above following Andrews’ 
approach through Edwards’ formal representation. As before, it is assumed that entrant 
firm faces a marginal demand function as described above, that there exists a minimum 
profitable scale ?̅? as in the first part of Modigliani’s analysis, but it is added a central 
Andrews’ assumption: costumers of the existing firms do not switch to the entrant firm’s 
good except in pursuit of a price advantage. In this way the Bhagwati put in another 
variable that is the degree of confidence gained by existing firms with respect to 
costumers19. This produces an increment in oligopolist’s premium over entrant firm.  
Thus, using the same notation as before, the entry-preventing price now is given by: 20 
𝑃0 = 𝑃𝑐 [1 +
?̅?
𝑋𝑐(𝜂 + 𝜖)
], [1.4] 
where the new variable 𝜖 represents the elasticity, with respect to change in price, of the 
transfer of current buyers to the entrant. Since the derivative of 𝑃0 defined in [1.4] with 
respect to 𝜖 is negative, when costumers are not so willing to change their suppliers - 
which mean a low value of 𝜖 - then critical pre-entry price 𝑃0 rises, making entry harder. 
Moreover in his analysis Bhagwati went further, including the case of growing demand 
over time. He took the arguments proposed by Modigliani and Sylos Labini for which a 
growing demand (over time) puts a downward pressure on the premium that can be 
charged by established firm (because aggregate demand is now larger). And indeed the 
growth in aggregate demand can be interpreted as an increase in the size of the market 
since it consists in a right-side shift of demand curve. As a consequence 𝑋𝑐 raises (since 
𝑃𝑐 = 𝑐̅ does not change) and so, recalling that 𝑆 =
𝑋𝑐
?̅?
, market size increases21. 
                                                          
19 “The buyers of the product(…)will tend to look first to their customary suppliers because of the 
confidence gained by previous custom, and it is from these firms that they will normally buy” (Edwards 
1955) 
20 Generalizing for the case of many established firms we have 𝑃0 = 𝑃𝑐 [1 +
?̅?
𝑋𝑐(
𝜂
𝑁+1
+𝜖)
]. The number of 
firms already operating in the market influences positively the entry-preventing price, making entry harder. 
21 Bhagwati proposed another approach, including in the equation of critical entry-preventing price the 
growth rate of aggregate demand over time: 
 𝑃0 = 𝑃𝑐 [1 +
?̅? − 𝑘𝜆
𝑋𝑐 (
𝜂
𝑁 + 1 + 𝜖)
] 
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1.4 Entry and Stackelberg Equilibrium 
1.4.1 Introduction to the Model 
Entry is attractive for potential firms if expected profits are greater or equal than zero, i.e. 
if price after entry is greater or equal than average total cost of entrant firm. Hence, 
established firms may decide to apply an output/price policy in order to make entry 
unprofitable, creating in this way entry barriers. In this context Salop (1979) proposed a 
distinction between: 
a) Innocent entry-barriers, i.e., those barriers unintentionally erected by firms as a 
side effect of profit maximization; 
b) Strategic entry-barriers, i.e., those barriers erected to reduce possibility of entry. 
However Bain (1956) defined, years earlier, three kinds of price/output strategies that can 
be used by established oligopolistic firms in face of entry: 
c) Entry may be blockaded: this is the case in which entry is impeded simply by a 
price/output policy coherent with profit maximization regardless of possibility of 
entry; 
d) Entry may be effectively impeded: price/output policy is designed to make entry 
unprofitable; 
e) Entry may be ineffectively impeded: price/output policy is not intended to 
discourage potential entrants. 
Indeed, points a) and c) coincides: when established firms act as simple profit maximizers 
they may create unawarely a barrier to entry, i.e. potential entrant firms are not able to 
enter the market without the existence of any change in established firms’ behaviors. 
While, point b) is the opposite case coherent with what proposed by Bain in points d) and 
e): established firms apply a strategy direct to impede entry, with or without success. In 
this case established firms are said to apply the limit pricing strategy, which consists in 
setting a price low enough to make entry is unprofitable: the so-called limit price. 
                                                          
Where 𝜆 is the growth of aggregate demand subsequent to entry, 𝑘 the proportion thereof that accrues to 
the entrant, and 𝑋𝑐aggregate demand at competitive price after growth. The result is the same: through the 
increment of 𝑋𝑐 and the negative element in the numerator, 𝑃0 decreases. 
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What we should analyze now is when limit pricing strategy is a rational choice for 
established firm, i.e., when it is consistent with long-run profit maximization in an 
oligopolistic market of a homogeneous good.22 
In order to do this, let us recall two basic assumptions already defined in Modigliani’s 
synthesis: first, established firms and potential entrants seek maximum profits over the 
long-run; second, established firm’s output is maintained fixed in face of new entry, 
letting the price fall and the market be ruined for all (Sylos’ postulate). Both assumptions 
are common knowledge among firms. Moreover it is generally assumed that established 
firm has a first-moving advantage over any entrant firm: 
“A pre-entry asymmetry advantage arises from the fundamental pre-entry 
asymmetry between established firm and potential entrant. Before the 
entrant make his entry decision, the established firm has already 
committed resources. This prior existence gives first-move advantages is 
independent […] of the post-entry game that might ensue; even if the post-
entry game is played according to Nash-Cournot or entrant-as-a-leader 
rules, the pre-entry leadership role always lies with established firm”. 
(Salop, 1979, p. 335) 
The presence of such asymmetries between oligopolistic firms is not new in the economic 
literature. Indeed H.F. von Stackelberg (1934) provided a model in which leader firms 
move first, enjoying such first-moving advantage, and then the follower firms move 
sequentially. But in Stackelberg’s model, all firms are already in the market, and the 
problem of entry is not considered. By the way, once a first-moving advantage is 
recognized for established firms  over prospective entrants, then Stackelberg equilibrium 
arises naturally in models of entry barriers, at least when entry is ineffectively impeded. 
But in this context established firms have another choice: that is to set limit price in order 
to deter entry. Therefore the incumbents must evaluate if the profits consistent with the 
limit price are greater or lower than the profits of leader firms in Stackelberg equilibrium.  
Another implicit assumption of the theory is that established firm recognizes the 
possibility of new entry and tries to determine if its profit will be grater if it deter or allow 
                                                          
22 This analysis will follow Osborne’s (1973) and Dixit’s (1979) contributions. 
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entry; and if it determines that it is better to deter entry by limit pricing, then the price set 
at the blocking point will be kept it there presumably indefinitely.23  
1.4.2 The model 
Let us analyze entry barriers in a quantity-setting duopoly with one established firm, 
operating in the market as a monopolist, and one prospective entrant, both producing an 
homogeneous good; they face an aggregate demand function negatively sloped and they 
hold the same technology, i.e. they have the same cost functions. In particular, this is a 
two-stage game in which: at stage one (when there is the threat of entry), established firm 
chooses the amount of output; at stage two, potential entrant firm decides to enter or not 
if given established firm’s output choice its own profit is non-negative. Define firm 1 the 
established firm and firm 2 prospective entrant firm. 
Both oligopolistic firms want to maximize their long-run profits; hence they face the 
following maximization problem: 
max
𝑥𝑖
𝜋𝑖(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝑃(𝑋)𝑥𝑖 − 𝐶(𝑥𝑖)      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖 = 1,2 [1.5] 
Where 𝑃(𝑋) is the inverse aggregate demand function with 𝑋 = 𝑥1 + 𝑥2; 𝐶(𝑥𝑖) is the 
cost function assumed equal for both firms; and 𝑥𝑖 is the output for the 𝑖th firm. 
Firms’ profits do not depend only on the amount produced by themselves, but also from 
that of the rival. Under Sylos’ postulate, entrant firm takes established firm’s output as a 
parameter on which it has no influence. But established firm knows that and, given 
knowledge of both entrant’s cost function and market demand, it can predict potential 
rival’s output for every level of output chosen by himself: that is, established firm realizes 
potential entrant’s reaction function. 
Reaction function is determined by the solution of the maximization problem written 
above; indeed for firm 2 we have: 
                                                          
23 Someone may say, as Osborne did, that the more profitable strategy for established firm might be “to 
reduce the price when entry threat is imminent and raise it when the threat has subsided. This more obvious, 
more direct, and (if successful) more profitable way of dealing with entry threats is foreign to the point of 
view of the theory;[…] (firm) uses Sylos’ postulate with reference  to an unlimited time horizon”. 
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max
𝑥2
𝜋2(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝑃(𝑋)𝑥2 − 𝐶(𝑥2). [1.6] 
By first order condition we get24: 
𝜕𝜋2
𝜕𝑥2
= 𝑃′(𝑋)𝑥2 + 𝑃(𝑋) −  𝐶′(𝑥2) = 0. [1.7] 
Solving [1.7] with respect to 𝑥2 we find the so-called reaction function for prospective 
entrant firm: it depicts how firm 2 will react given firm 1’s output choice, i.e., the level 
of output that maximizes potential entrant firm’s profit for every level of output chosen 
by established firm. Let us call this function 𝜙2(𝑥1); similarly for firm 1 we have its own 
reaction function 𝜙1(𝑥2). 
Firm 2’s reaction function is well-defined by established firm.  Hence, under threat of 
entry, firm 1 must follow the following maximization problem: 
max
𝑥1
𝜋1(𝑥1, 𝜙2(𝑥1)) = 𝑃(𝑥1 + 𝜙2(𝑥1))𝑥1 − 𝐶(𝑥1). [1.8] 
The solution of this problem is the Stackelberg point i.e., the tangency point between firm 
1’s iso-profit curve and firm 2’s reaction curve; this is shown in the figure below (Fig. 4). 
 
FIG 4 – Stackelberg equilibrium. (Source: Osborne, 1973) 
                                                          
24 Second order conditions are satisfied too; that is  
∂2π2
∂2x2
< 0. 
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In the picture reaction functions are drawn for both established and potential firms25. Firm 
1’s iso-profit curves 𝜋1(𝑥1, 𝑥2) describe the combination of 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 that generate the 
same level of profit for established firm: they are concave to 𝑥1-axis and closer curves to 
the axis refers to greater level of profits. Firm 1’s maximum profit occur at the point 
(𝑀1, 0) where its reaction function intersects 𝑥1-axis: this is the monopolistic behavior. 
But given the threat of entry and under Sylos’ postulate, established firm’s maximum 
profit occurs at the tangency point between its iso-profit curve and prospective entrant 
reaction function; firm 1 will produce the amount of output ?̅?1 consistent with the 
Stackelberg solution of the leader firm. The corresponding amount of output of firm 2 
will be 𝜙2( ?̅?1) =  ?̅?2. Indeed entrant firm, given monopolist’s choice, will enter the 
market supplying the amount of output  ?̅?2 consistent with the follower’s output in 
Stackelberg duopoly, since 𝜋2(?̅?1, ?̅?2) is greater than zero. On the contrary, entry-
deterring output associated with the limit price is determined by 𝜙2(𝑥1) = 0 consistent 
with the point (𝑥1
0, 0). 
In figure 4, ?̅?1 < 𝑥1
0; then Stackelberg output is lower than entry-deterring output. To 
maximize its profit firm 1 will prefer to allow entry losing its monopoly position, instead 
of producing the quantity 𝑥1
0 consistent with a lower level of profit (indeed iso-profit 
curve 𝜋1(𝑥1
0, 0) is far away from 𝑥1-axis). Therefore in this case established firm will not 
set a limit price.26 
However ?̅?1 may be greater or equal than 𝑥1
0, as in figure below (Fig. 5). There, the profit-
maximizing output will deter entry and limit price theory will be rational. Hence, we 
should investigate when this condition occurs. 
                                                          
25 Reaction functions are drawn linear for graphical convenience. Concavity of revenue function and 
convexity for cost function are assumed in order to ensure the negative slope of the curves. 
26 We neglect the possibility that M1 = x̅1.  In this case, entry would be blockaded by innocent profit 
maximization of monopolistic firm. 
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        FIG 5 – Stackelberg equilibrium occurs precisely at (𝑥1
0, 0).  
     (Source: Osborne, 1973) 
In figure 5 at entry-deterring point entrant’s reaction function is steeper than firm 1’s iso-
profit curve 𝜋1(𝑥1
0, 0). Hence monopolist will deter entry only if the iso-profit curve 
passing through entry-deterring point is no steeper than entrant’s reaction function. 
Let 𝜙′
2
(𝑥1
0) denote the slope of firm 2’s reaction function, and 𝐼′(𝑥1
0) the slope of firm 
1’s iso-profit curve. Then, since both slopes are negative limit pricing consistency 
solution will be: 
𝐼′(𝑥1
0) ≥ 𝜙′
2
(𝑥1
0). [1.9] 
The relation can be expressed in terms of the underlying demand and cost functions. Firm 
2’s reaction function is such that: 
𝜕𝜋2(𝑥1, 𝜙2(𝑥1))
𝜕𝑥2
≡ 0 . [1.10] 
Differentiating this identity and solving for 𝜙2(𝑥1) we get the slope of reaction function
27: 
𝜙′2(𝑥1) = −
𝜕2𝜋2
𝜕𝑥2𝜕𝑥1
⁄
𝜕2𝜋2
𝜕2𝑥2
⁄
= −
𝑃′′(𝑋)𝑥2 + 𝑃
′(𝑋)
𝑃′′(𝑋)𝑥2 + 2𝑃′(𝑋) − 𝐶′′(𝑥2)
 . 
[1.11] 
                                                          
27Indeed  
∂2π2
∂x2 ∂x1
= P′′(X)x2 + P
′(X),  and  
∂2π2
∂2x2
= P′′(X)x2 + 2P
′(X) − C′′(x2). 
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Evaluated at entry-deterring point (𝑥1
0, 0) we get 
𝜙′
2
(𝑥1
0) = −
𝑃′(𝑥1
0)
2𝑃′(𝑥1
0) − 𝐶′′(0)
< 0 . [1.12] 
In order to find the slope of firm 1’s iso-profit curve let us first differentiate its profit 
function obtaining: 
𝑑𝑥2
𝑑𝑥1
= 𝐼′(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = −
𝑥1𝑃
′(𝑋) + 𝑃(𝑋) − 𝐶′(𝑥1)
𝑥1𝑃′(𝑋)
. [1.13] 
Evaluated at (𝑥1
0, 0) is 
𝐼′(𝑥1
0, 0) = −
𝑥1
0𝑃′(𝑥1
0) + 𝑃(𝑥1
0) − 𝐶′(𝑥1
0)
𝑥1
0𝑃′(𝑥1
  0)
< 0 . [1.14] 
Hence 𝐼′(𝑥1
0) ≥ 𝜙′
2
(𝑥1
0) is satisfied if 
−
𝑥1
0𝑃′(𝑥1
0) + 𝑃(𝑥1
0) − 𝐶′(𝑥1
0)
𝑥1
0𝑃′(𝑥1
0)
≥ −
𝑃′(𝑥1
0)
2𝑃′(𝑥1
0) − 𝐶′′(0)
 . 
 
[1.15] 
When condition [1.15] holds, Stackelberg output will deter entry and limit price 𝑃(𝑥1
0) 
will be consistent with established firm’s profit maximization; otherwise entry will be 
ineffectively impeded. 
Summarizing, we have found two basic results: first, Sylos postulate essentially gives rise 
to a Stackelberg equilibrium; second, limit pricing strategy must be consistent with such 
equilibrium, hence it will rise only when the Stackelberg point occurs at a corner of 
potential entrant’s reaction function. 
 
 
 
33 
 
1.4.3 The Model with Fixed Costs 
In the previous model we neglected any assumption on economies of scale. Indeed we 
implicitly assumed that entrant firm could supply any amount of output and earn non-
negative profit at least as long as price is greater or equal than average cost.  
However, if potential entrant firm’s technology is characterized by minimum amount of 
profitable scale, the story change since not all the quantities greater than zero ensure 
positive (or at least equal to zero) profits. 
In section 1.3 we have shown, through Modigliani’s results, that the existence of a 
minimum profitable scale constitutes a barrier to entry. Therefore, adding this hypothesis 
in the model described above, we should find an increase in the possibilities of deterring 
entry. This situation can be described by assuming that entrant firm must sustain a fixed 
entry cost (or setup cost) in order to come into the market.28 
Let us recall the previous model, including this particular assumption. In this case firm 
2’s profit function will be such that: 
𝜋2(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝑃(𝑋)𝑥2 − 𝐶(𝑥2) − 𝐹, [1.16] 
where 𝐹 represents the fixed cost. Therefore firm 2 will enter the market if: 
𝜋2(𝑥1) = 𝑃(𝑋)𝜙2(𝑥1) − 𝐶(𝜙2(𝑥1)) − 𝐹 ≥ 0. [1.17] 
Let  𝑥1
𝐹 < 𝑥1
0 be the level of firm 1’s output such that  
𝑃(𝑋)𝜙2(𝑥1
𝐹) − 𝐶(𝜙2(𝑥1
𝐹)) = 𝐹. [1.18] 
Now, every 𝑥1
𝐹 < 𝑥1 ≤ 𝑥1
0 chosen by established firm will induce negative profits for 
prospective entrant firm. Thus if 𝑥1 belongs to that interval, the optimal response  for firm 
2 is no longer given by the appropriate point on 𝜙2(𝑥1); it is better to secure zero profit 
by staying out of the market. Hence firm 2’s reaction function is now discontinuous, as 
shown in the following picture. 
                                                          
28 This cost can be justified in many ways: the entrant is a large firm; or the industry is characterized by an 
initial mandatory investment. 
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   FIG 6 – Entrant’s reaction curve is now discontinuous due to the existence  
                of fixed entry cost. 
The position of the discontinuity depends on the level of firm 2’s fixed cost. If these were 
so high that firm 2 cannot even make positive profit as a monopolist, then its reaction 
function would simply be 0𝑥1
0; this case will be ignored29.   
In figure 6, 𝑥1
𝐹  represents the amount of firm 1’s output consistent with the discontinuity 
point of  firm 2’s reaction function, while 𝑥1
𝑠 is the amount of established firm’s output 
consistent with Stackelberg point’s profits level. If entrant’s fixed cost is so small that 
point 𝑥1
𝐹  of discontinuity in its reaction function lies to the right of 𝑥1
𝑠, the best choice for 
firm 1 remains Stackelberg solution, and it is optimal for established firm to allow entry. 
If potential entrant’s fixed cost is so large that 𝑥1
𝐹  lies to the left of 𝑀1, the best choice for 
firm 1 is precisely to produce monopoly quantity 𝑀1  blocking the entry of firm 2.  
The intermediate case where 𝑀1 < 𝑥1
𝐹 < 𝑥1
𝑆 (the case of figure 6) needs more attention. 
Indeed in this last case firm 1 can do better than Stackelberg point S by setting its output 
somewhat below 𝑥1
𝑆, so that firm 2 stays out. This profit can be increased by further 
lowering 𝑥1 up to any value slightly greater than 𝑥1
𝐹 . If firm 1 sets its output exactly at 
𝑥1
𝐹 , then firm 2 is indifferent between staying out and entering the market with zero profit. 
But the entry would decrease substantially established firm’s profit by the increase in 
aggregate supply and the consequent reduction in equilibrium price level. Therefore so 
long as there is a positive probability of entry at 𝑥1
𝐹 , the monopolist should keep its output 
                                                          
29 A discontinuity may affect firm 1’s reaction function curve in presence of fixed cost for established firm 
too. However it is assumed that monopolist is operating in the market for a long time; hence it has already 
depreciated any fixed cost. 
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slightly greater than 𝑥1
𝐹  - which is the limit output with the corresponding limit price 𝑃𝐿 ≅
𝑃(𝑥1
𝐹 , 0) - since it is the highest price that make entry unprofitable. In conclusion, in this 
intermediate case firm 1 finds it profitable to deter entry, and limit pricing strategy is 
applied by established firm. 
Thus without fixed cost entry is deterred by setting limit output at 𝑥1
0 only if condition 
[1.9] holds; while in presence of fixed costs there are two possibilities: if 𝑥1
𝐹 > 𝑀1 entry 
is effectively impeded  with a limit pricing equilibrium at 𝑥1
𝐹; and if 𝑥1
𝐹 < 𝑀1 entry is 
blockaded with the pure monopoly output at 𝑀1.  
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Chapter 2 
CAPACITY INVESTMENT AND THE 
DESERTION OF SYLOS’ POSTULATE 
2.1 Introduction 
The role of investment decision as a barrier to entry has been first developed by Spence 
(1977) who provided the possibility of yielding idle capacity in order to deter the entry of 
new firms in the market. The process is the following: at the stage when entry is 
threatened but not yet implemented, established firm is able to make an irrevocable 
investment decision on capacity; such capacity level may be higher than the level required 
for producing monopoly output level, but at the same time it might be necessary in order 
to impede the entry of a new firm, since it is assumed that the time-lag required for 
increasing production to the maximum capacity level is equal to the time-lag required for 
entering the market. Hence Spence provided the possibility for established firm to sustain 
a monopoly output without inducing entry, notwithstanding producing in an inefficient 
way and yielding idle capacity. 
The intuition of pre-commitment capacity investment as a barrier to entry introduced by 
Spence (1977) was later expanded by Dixit (1980) who provided an entry barrier model 
that can be rightly considered a breaking point with previous literature, since the author 
no longer applied Sylos’ postulate. Under Sylos’ postulate, incumbent firms are supposed 
to sustain the pre-entry output level in face of entry, threating a significant reduction of 
price level if entry effectively takes place. As we will see, this is not a credible threat, 
since established firms might prefer an accommodating reduction of output. On the 
contrary, due to the irrevocable investment decision, Dixit provided a model where 
incumbent’s threat is absolutely credible, i.e. it is a best response to the entry threat. 
The connection between Spence and Dixit is strong; nevertheless they reached different 
results. Indeed, even if Dixit gave a central role to investment decision as an entry 
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deterrence - as Spence did - in his model we do not observe the possibility of idle capacity 
for established firms. However, Bulow et al. (1985) demonstrated that, if firms face a 
certain type of aggregate demand, the possibility of idle capacity can arise also in Dixit’s 
model. Hence, Spence’s intuition for which entry threat may induce inefficient production 
for established firms is absolutely consistent with Dixit’s approach. 
In this chapter first we will introduce Spence’s excess capacity model; then we will 
present Dixit’s model, demonstrating the absence of idle capacity; finally, we will 
develop the extension proposed by Bulow et al., who introduced the possibility of idle 
capacity in Dixit’s model. 
2.2 Excess Capacity Model 
2.2.1 Capacity Constraint 
So far we have implicitly assumed that both entrant and established firms were able to 
supply any quantity of output, from zero to infinity. However it is really hard to believe 
that firms can produce an infinite amount of output: typically they are characterized by a 
capacity constraint, i.e., by a maximum level of feasible output. The goal of this section 
is to explain how the problem of entry barriers changes when firms in the industry are 
bounded on their own capacity.  
Including capacity constraint means adding another variable to our problem, which may 
affect the equilibria written in the previous section. For instance, established firm may 
not be large enough to set a limit quantity in order to deter entry; this is what suggested 
in the picture below, where 𝑘 is the capacity measured in unit of output. 
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FIG 7 - Established firm cannot produce limit output quantity when 𝑘 < 𝑥1
𝐹. 
Figure 7 represents the same situation described in the previous chapter but now firm 1 
cannot produce an amount of output greater than 𝑘; this means that established firm is not 
able to reach the entry-preventing output 𝑥1
𝐹 . Therefore entry cannot be deterred, and the 
best for firm 1 is to set the level of output consistent with the Stackelberg solution.30 
Indeed now established firm must solve the following maximization problem: 
max
𝑥1
𝜋1(𝑥1, 𝜙2(𝑥1)) = 𝑃(𝑥1 + 𝜙2(𝑥1))𝑥1 − 𝐶(𝑥1) 
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑥1 ≤ 𝑘  [2.1] 
In [2.1] capacity is assumed to be exogenous. However, if established firm is able to make 
investment decisions (i.e. to choose its own capacity), then it may discourage entry of 
potential firms through a strategic capacity choice. This is what suggested by Spence 
(1977, p. 534): 
“Existing firms choose capacity in a strategic way designed to discourage 
entry. This strategic purpose is realized by holding excess capacity in the 
pre-entry period. The excess capacity permits existing firms to expand 
output and reduce price when entry in threatened, thereby reducing the 
                                                          
30 It is just an example since k may be lower than S. In that case firm 1 will reach a corner solution, supplying 
an amount of output equal to k. 
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prospective entrant profits of the new entrant who operates in the residual 
demand.” 
2.2.2 The Model 
Let us focus on established firm’s behavior. When capacity is a variable that a firm can 
manipulate, the monopolist with no entry threat must solve the following maximization 
problem: 
max
𝑥,𝑘
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑘) = 𝑅(𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑥) − 𝑟𝑘 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑥 ≤ 𝑘 [2.2] 
where 𝑟 is the annual cost of capacity (interest on debt),  𝑅(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑃(𝑋) is the increasing 
and concave revenue function and 𝐶(𝑥) is the increasing and convex variable cost 
function. In order to find a solution to this constrained maximization problem let us 
introduce the Lagrangian function: 
𝐿(𝑥, 𝑘, 𝜆) = 𝑅(𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑥) − 𝑟𝑘 + 𝜆(𝑘 − 𝑥). 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑥
= 0 ⇒  𝑅′(𝑥) − 𝐶′(𝑥) − 𝜆 = 0  
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑘
= 0 ⇒ 𝜆 − 𝑟 = 0 
[2.3] 
 
[2.4] 
𝜆(𝑥 − 𝑘) = 0  [2.5] 
𝜆 ≥ 0. [2.6] 
From [2.4] 𝜆 = 𝑟; therefore capacity constraint is binding since 𝜆 > 0. Thus, with no 
entry threat 𝑥 = 𝑘, and substituting 𝜆 = 𝑟  in [2.3], at the maximum 𝑅′(𝑥) = 𝐶′(𝑥) + 𝑟 
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Now, suppose that existing firm sets a certain level of capacity 𝑘; then when entry occurs, 
it is assumed that established firm can expand the output up to 𝑘 and reduce the price to 
𝑃(𝑘) within the time horizon required for entry.31 
Entrant firms face the residual demand defined as the part of aggregate demand curve on 
the left of the pre-entry price, as in Modigliani (1958). Suppose that pre-entry price level 
is 𝑃(𝑘) and prospective entrant firm supplies a positive amount of output 𝑦; then the price 
after-entry will be 𝑃(𝑘 + 𝑦) and entry will occur if this price is greater than potential 
entrant’s average cost. Thus entry is deterred if 
∀𝑦 ≥ 0, 𝑃(𝑘 + 𝑦) < 𝑎(𝑦, 𝑘). 
Where 𝑎(𝑦, 𝑘) is the average cost function. If 𝑘 increases, 𝑃(𝑘 + 𝑦) falls for every 𝑦. 
Therefore, there exists a minimum level of 𝑘, denoted ?̃?, for which the condition above 
holds and entry is deterred. Hence, if established firm wants to maximize its profit and, 
at the same time, impede entry, it must solve the following constrained maximization: 
max
𝑥,𝑘
𝜋(𝑥, 𝑘) = 𝑅(𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑥) − 𝑟𝑘 
𝑠. 𝑡.  
𝑥 ≤ 𝑘
𝑘 ≥ ?̃?
 [2.7] 
The Lagrangian function for this problem is 
𝐿(𝑥, 𝑘, 𝜆, 𝜇, ) = 𝑅(𝑥) − 𝐶(𝑥) − 𝑟𝑘 + 𝜆(𝑘 − 𝑥) + 𝜇(𝑘 − ?̃?) 
And the corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑥
= 0 ⇒  𝑅′(𝑥) − 𝐶′(𝑥) − 𝜆 = 0  [2.8] 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑘
= 0 ⇒ 𝜆 + 𝜇 − 𝑟 = 0 [2.9] 
𝜆(𝑘 − 𝑥) = 0  [2.10] 
𝜇(𝑘 − ?̃?) = 0 [2.11] 
                                                          
31 With respect to the time horizon required for the installation of capacity, the industry is on an equal 
footing with the potential entrant. 
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𝜇, 𝜆 ≥ 0 [2.12] 
We have three possible solutions to the problem: 
1) 𝜆 > 0, 𝜇 = 0. This is the profit maximization [2.2] described before by which 
costs are minimized, 𝜆 = 𝑟, 𝑥 = 𝑘 and 𝑅′(𝑥) = 𝐶′(𝑥) + 𝑟. In this case entry is 
blockaded since innocent profit maximization establishes a level of 𝑘 that make 
entry unprofitable.  
2) 𝜆 = 0, 𝜇 > 0. In this case the second constraint is active and ?̃? = 𝑘 i.e. capacity 
is set in order to deter entry. Moreover 𝜇 = 𝑟 and 𝑥 < 𝑘 is such that 𝑅′(𝑥) =
𝐶′(𝑥). Therefore costs are not minimized given the level of output actually 
supplied and capacity is maintained above its efficient level in order to deter entry. 
3) 𝜆 > 0, 𝜇 > 0. Here both constraints are binding, therefore 𝑥 = 𝑘 = ?̃?. Unlike the 
second case, entry is deterred but in an efficient way since 𝑥 = ?̃? and costs are 
minimized. In absence of threat of entry (i.e. the second constraint is removed) 
capacity and output would come down together. 
Let us interpret these results in limit price theory context. Case 1) describes a situation in 
which entry is blockaded since monopolist’s profit maximization, regardless of potential 
entrant firms, is sufficient to set a level of output that make entry unprofitable. At the 
opposite, case 3) describes a successful limit price strategy: the amount of output supplied 
by established firm lets fall the price under prospective entrant’s average costs and 
impedes the entry. In this case 𝑥 = ?̃? and 𝑃(?̃?) is the corresponding price. What has been 
ruled out until now is the prevision of case 2). In that situation established firm carries 
excess capacity, given the output, and production is inefficient; moreover since 𝑥 < 𝑘 =
?̃? then 𝑃(𝑥) > 𝑃(?̃?). Even though the price is higher than limit price, entry is deterred by 
excess capacity. As a result, the price will be higher than the limit one and production 
will be inefficient, generating idle capacity. 
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2.3 Dixit’s Model 
2.3.1 Problems with Sylos’ Postulate 
The introduction of capacity variable is the starting point in order to relax the very strong 
assumption so far assumed, that is Sylos’ postulate. This assumption was necessary for 
the complicated game-theoretic aspects of entry in oligopolistic markets. Indeed, even in 
the simplest case of one established firm and one prospective entrant, there are many 
strategic interactions depending on pre-entry decisions by established firm, which will 
influence prospective entrant’s expected profit; the monopolist will try to exploit these 
possibilities to its own advantage. In this context, Sylos’ postulate is dubious on two 
opposing counts: first, faced with an irrevocable fact of entry, the established firm will 
usually finds it best to make an accommodating output reduction; at the opposite, it would 
like to threaten to respond to entry with a predatory increase in output. Its problem is to 
make the latter threat credible given the prospective entrant’s knowledge of the former 
act, and this is not obvious. Applying Sylos’ postulate means not only that established 
firm maintains its amount of output fixed, but also that prospective entrant strongly 
believes in such behavior.  
Suppose the best for established firm is an accommodating reduction of output, but it 
wants to trick the prospective entrant threatening a predatory increase of production; is 
this strategy credible for the prospective entrant, i.e. will potential firm stay out of the 
market because of established firm’s threat? The answer is no. By the basic assumptions 
of rationality and perfect information, there is no reason why potential firm should stay 
out of the market since it perfectly knows that, in face of entry, incumbent firm will 
reduces its output at the level that is the best for itself. Thus, the increase in output (and 
its sustaining) is not a credible threat. From these considerations the need arose for a new 
representative model of entry in oligopolistic markets that did not involve Sylos’ 
postulate. 
Dixit introduced a new approach on entry-barriers problem in 1979 (“A model of duopoly 
suggesting a theory of entry barriers”), afterwards expanded one year later in “The role 
of investment in entry-deterrence”. In particular the author considered Spence’s approach 
fpr which in the interest of entry-deterrence, the established firm may set capacity at such 
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a high level that in the pre-entry phase it would not want to utilize it all, i.e. excess 
capacity would be observed. The basic point in Dixit’s analysis is that “although the rules 
of the post-entry game are taken to be exogenous, the established firm can alter the 
outcome to its own advantage by changing the initial conditions. In particular, an 
irrevocable choice of investment allows it to alter its post-entry marginal curve, and 
thereby the post-entry equilibrium under any specified rule.” 
2.3.2 The Model with Pre-Commitment Capacity 
Dixit’s model is a three-stage game with one established firm (firm 1) and one potential 
entrant firm (firm 2). At the first stage, established firm chooses a pre-entry capacity level 
?̅?1 which may subsequently be increased, but cannot be reduced. At the second stage the 
other firm decides to enter the market. If it enters, the two will achieve a duopoly Cournot-
Nash equilibrium with quantity-setting; otherwise established firm will prevail as a 
monopolist. In order to find the possible equilibria for this game, we will use backward 
induction, starting the analysis from the third stage up to the investment decision of the 
first stage. 
 The third stage 
Each firm is assumed to have the following cost function: 
𝐶𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖 + 𝑤𝑖𝑥𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑖           𝑖 = 1,2 [2.13] 
where 𝐹𝑖 is the fixed set-up cost, 𝑟𝑖 is the constant annual cost of capacity and 𝑤𝑖 the 
constant average variable cost for output.32 The revenues for both firms will be functions 
𝑅𝑖(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝑥𝑖𝑃(𝑋)       𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ    𝑋 = 𝑥1 + 𝑥2 [2.14] 
where 𝑃(𝑋) is the usual inverse aggregate demand function. Revenue function is assumed 
to be increasing and concave in firm’s output and decreasing in the other’s output.33 
                                                          
32 Of course the two firms may have the same cost function. 
33 
𝜕𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖
> 0, 
𝜕2𝑅𝑖
𝜕2𝑥𝑖
< 0 and  
𝜕𝑅𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗
< 0 
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Now suppose that firm 1 has installed the capacity ?̅?1. If the quantity produced is within 
capacity level (𝑥1 ≤ ?̅?1), then its total cost function is 
𝐶1 = 𝐹1 + 𝑟1?̅?1 + 𝑤1𝑥1. [2.15] 
If it wishes to produce a greater amount of output, it must acquire additional capacity. 
Therefore if 𝑥1 > ?̅?1 
𝐶1 = 𝐹1 + (𝑟1 + 𝑤1)𝑥1. [2.16] 
Firm 2 has no pre-commitment capacity, then it will acquire the efficient capacity 𝑘2 =
𝑥2; therefore  
𝐶2 = 𝐹2 + (𝑟2 + 𝑤2)𝑥2. [2.17] 
Let us focus on firm 1’s cost function. In particular as long as its output is lower than the 
capacity installed, marginal cost equals 𝑤1 while, for level of 𝑥1 greater than ?̅?1 marginal 
cost is equal to 𝑟1 + 𝑤1. Therefore the choice of ?̅?1 affects the shape of firm 1’s marginal 
cost curve, which in turn affects its reaction curve. Since the Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
is given by the intersection of firms’ reaction curve, the choice of ?̅?1, which affects firm 
1’s reaction curve, influences the final duopoly equilibrium too. Indeed, write firm 1’ 
reaction function as follows: 
𝜋′1(𝑥1
𝐶) = 𝑥1
𝐶𝑃′(𝑋) + 𝑃(𝑋) − 𝐶′1(𝑥1
𝐶) = 0  ⇒ 
⇒ 𝑥1
𝐶 ≡ 𝜙1(𝑥2) = −
𝑃(𝑋) − 𝐶′1(𝑥1
𝐶)
𝑃′(𝑋)
≥ 0 [2.18] 
The increase in marginal cost produces a decrease of the 𝑥1 consistent with reaction curve, 
for every value of 𝑥2, i.e. a down-ward shift of reaction curve (Figure 8).  
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FIG 8 – The effect of marginal cost on firm 1’s reaction curve. 
Take a look on the first graphic of figure 8. The points 𝑀 and 𝑁 have the coordinates 
(𝑀1, 0) and (𝑁1, 0) respectively. The quantities 𝑀1 and 𝑁1 represent profit maximizing 
quantity choices for firm 1 when the possibility of entry is ignored (i.e. for 𝑥2 = 0); but 
𝑀1 is the choice in the case in which firm 1 has not installed a pre-commitment capacity 
(and marginal cost equals 𝑟1 + 𝑤1), while 𝑁1 is relevant when there is a capacity already 
installed. Since firm 2 has no prior capacity commitment, its reaction function 𝑅𝑅′ is 
straightforward as shown in figure 9. 
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FIG 9 – The curves 𝑀𝑀′ and 𝑁𝑁′ represent firm 1’s reaction curve in  
two opposite circumstances: 𝑀𝑀′ when capacity costs matter, while 
 𝑁𝑁′ when capacity has been already installed. (Source: Dixit, 1980) 
For a given level of ?̅?1 we have a Cournot-Nash equilibrium at the intersection of the two 
reaction curves. However firm 1, choosing ?̅?1 in advance, can determine which reaction 
function it will present in the post-entry duopoly; surely it will choose the level of ?̅?1 that 
will maximize its profit given the well-defined firm 2’s reaction curve. Now, let 𝑇 =
(𝑇1, 𝑇2) be the intersection point between 𝑅𝑅′ and 𝑀𝑀′ and 𝑉 = (𝑉1, 𝑉2) the point of 
intersection between 𝑅𝑅′ and 𝑁𝑁′. The points 𝑇 and 𝑉 are two Nash equilibria in opposite 
circumstances: the first equilibrium is consistence with the case in which firm 1 must 
acquire more capacity and this cost matters; while 𝑉 is the Nash equilibrium when         
𝑥1 ≤ 𝑘1 and marginal cost is simply 𝑤1. 
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FIG 10 – In the first graphic Nash equilibrium occurs at 𝑇, while in the second at 𝑉. 
For a choice of ?̅?1 ≤ 𝑇1 the post-entry Nash equilibrium will be at 𝑇 while for ?̅?1 ≥ 𝑉1 it 
will occur at 𝑉 (Figure 10). Hence, since 𝑉1 is the maximum level of established firm’s 
production consistent with post-entry equilibrium, any capacity level above 𝑉1 is not a 
credible threat of entry deterrence.34 Accordingly, since 𝑁1 > 𝑉1, it is evident that level  
of ?̅?1 ≥ 𝑁1 are not credible too.
35 Established firm will not install a pre-entry capacity 
                                                          
34 “When a prospective entrant is confident of its ability to sustain a Nash equilibrium in the post-entry 
game, it does not fear such levels. And when the established firm knows this, it does not try out the costly 
and empty threat” (Dixit, 1980). 
35 In this context, Spence’s excess capacity described in previous section, by which established firm set a 
capacity level greater than the optimal monopolist quantity in order to deter entry, will never be employed.  
48 
 
lower than 𝑇1 since it needs at least 𝑇1 in case of entry, and 𝑀1 > 𝑇1 if entry is not to 
occur. Hence pre-entry capacity will be chosen between these two extremis 𝑇1 ≤ ?̅?1 ≤
𝑉1, the final equilibrium will be at the intersection point between firm 2’s reaction curve 
and the vertical line by which 𝑥1 = ?̅?1. 
So far we have two certainties: first, established firm will choose a capacity level between 
𝑇1 and 𝑉1; second, in order to minimize cost, it will produce the quantity 𝑥1 = ?̅?1. Hence, 
post-entry equilibrium lies in the segment 𝑇𝑉. 
 The second stage 
The discussion concerned the third stage, i.e. the post-entry duopoly. Now we can pass 
on the second stage, in which firm 2 makes its decision in order to enter or not the market. 
As always, prospective entrant firm will come into the market if its expected profit is 
nonnegative,36 that is, if 
𝜋2(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝑅2(𝑥1, 𝑥2) − 𝐹2 − (𝑟2 + 𝑤2)𝑥2 ≥ 0. 
By the existence of set-up cost, prospective entrant’s profit is non-positive for a level of 
established firm’s output lower than 𝑅′ (Figure 9)37. Moreover firm 2’s profit decreases 
monotonically along its reaction function from 𝑇 to 𝑉, therefore we can classify first two 
extreme possibilities. 
1) 𝜋2(𝑇) < 0. In this case prospective entrant’s profit is negative in every post-
entry equilibrium. Therefore it will not try to enter the market and established 
firm will enjoy a pure monopoly by setting its capacity and output at 𝑀1. Entry 
is blockaded. 
2) 𝜋2(𝑉) > 0. Here prospective entrant will earn positive profit in every post-
entry equilibrium; therefore established firm cannot deter entry. The best it 
can do is to compute its profits along the segment 𝑇𝑉 and choose the amount 
of output consistent with the higher profit. Therefore since quantity equals 
capacity, we can use the conventional iso-profit curve in order to find the 
                                                          
36 It is imposed that established firm’s profit maximum value is always positive.  
37 This has been shown in section 1.4.3. We saw that there exists a level of established firm’s output denoted 
x1
F where firm 2’s variable profits equal fixed costs. In that point potential entrant’s reaction function is 
discontinuous since for level of x1 > x1
F, x2 = 0, because firm 2’s profits would be negative and prospective 
entrant will prefer to stay out of the market. 
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solution. The solution will be the tangency point between firm 1’s iso-profit 
curve and firm 2’s reaction curve, i.e. the Stackelberg solution.38 
However the richest set of possibilities can be found in the intermediate case in which 
𝜋2(𝑇) > 0 > 𝜋2(𝑉). Now there exists a point 𝐵 = (𝐵1, 𝐵2) along the relevant segment 
𝑇𝑉 such that prospective entrant’s profit equals zero. If ?̅?1 ≥ 𝐵1 firm 2’s expected profit 
will be negative and prospective entrant will not enter the market. Therefore 𝐵1 is the 
entry-preventing output, and we have to distinguish among the following possibilities. 
3a) 𝐵1 < 𝑀1. Here established firm’s monopoly choice is sufficient to impede 
entry, hence entry is blockaded. 
3b) 𝐵1 > 𝑀1. In this case established firm can deter entry only setting a capacity 
at a level greater than monopoly output. Therefore it should evaluate if the 
profit consistent with the entry-deterring quantity is greater than the profit 
corresponding to the entry-accommodating output. To prevent entry it needs 
a capacity just greater than entry-preventing output 𝐵1. On the contrary, if 
firm 1 allows entry, it will reach the Stackelberg solution (tangency or corner 
solution as seen above): let us call the Stackelberg point 𝑆 = (𝑆1, 𝑆2). Then, 
if 𝜋1(𝑆) < 𝜋1(𝐵1, 0), firm 1 will deter entry by setting a limit output (limit 
capacity) slightly higher than 𝐵1, with the correspondent limit price. 
Otherwise it is better to allow entry, i.e. entry is ineffectively impeded, and 
duopoly equilibrium will occur in the Stackelberg point 𝑆. 
 
 
 The first stage 
In the first stage firm 1 will set the capacity level consistent with post-entry Nash 
equilibrium in order to minimize total costs. Knowing the final result of the game, 
established firm has no reason for choosing a capacity level greater than equilibrium 
output, suffering cost for the unused capacity. Indeed, if 𝑋∗ = (𝑥1
∗, 𝑥2
∗) is post-entry 
equilibrium output, established firm must solve the following maximization problem: 
 
                                                          
38 If the tangency solution occurs on the right of V, there will be a corner solution at V. 
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max
𝑘1
  𝜋1(𝑘) = 𝑅(𝑥1
∗ , 𝑥2
∗) − 𝐹1 − 𝑟1𝑘1 − 𝑤1𝑥1
∗  
𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑘1 ≥ 𝑥1
∗  [2.19] 
The Lagrangian function for this problem is 
𝐿(𝑘1, 𝜆) = 𝑅(𝑥1
∗, 𝑥2
∗) − 𝐹1 − 𝑟1𝑘1 − 𝑤1𝑥1
∗ + 𝜆(𝑘1 − 𝑥1
∗) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑘1
= −𝑟1 + 𝜆 = 0  ⇒  𝑟1 = 𝜆 > 0 [2.20] 
𝜆(𝑘1 − 𝑥1
∗) = 0 [2.21] 
𝜆 ≥ 0. [2.22] 
Since 𝜆 > 0, [2.21] holds if and only if 𝑘1 = 𝑥1
∗, and the game is solved. 
In conclusion, through a pre-commitment capacity investment, established firm can alter 
the final outcome to its own advantage. Surely, there exists a limit; indeed, if in standard 
models with Sylos’ postulate established firm has always the possibility to deter entry 
and, if it allows entry, it is because of the greater profit deriving from this last choice, in 
Dixit’s model there is a case in which entry cannot be impeded. This happens when 
𝜋2(𝑉) > 0. Therefore, even if established firm is able to raise barriers to entry with its 
behavior, in this last model this power is lower than that of an established firm in a model 
with Sylos’ postulate. 
2.3.3 Idle capacity in Dixit’s model 
Established firm’s investment decision in pre-entry stage is the crucial element in Dixit’s 
work. Indeed the incumbent will set a capacity level equal to the post-entry Nash 
equilibrium if entry cannot be impeded; otherwise, if it is able to impede entry, it must 
evaluate if its profit will be greater when entry is allowed or not; and if established firm 
finds it best to deter entry, it will install an amount of capacity consistent with the entry-
deterring output level. Moreover, it has been shown that we do not observe Spence’s 
excess capacity, since the monopoly output when there is enough spare capacity is greater 
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than the maximum level of output consistent with the intersection between the two 
reaction curves, i.e. greater than any post-entry Nash equilibrium. 
However, as Bulow et al. have pointed out39, this conclusion depends on the assumption 
that firm’s marginal revenue (or equivalently marginal profit) is always decreasing in 
other’s output; as a consequence, firm’s reaction curve is always decreasing in rival’s 
output. Nevertheless, this condition does not always hold.  
Suppose, as before, that there is one established firm (firm 1) and one prospective entrant 
firm (firm 2). Recall firm 1’s revenue function40 𝑅1 = 𝑃(𝑋)𝑥1, where 𝑃(𝑋) is the usual 
negatively sloped inverse aggregate demand function, and 𝑋 = 𝑥1 + 𝑥2. Marginal 
revenue function for firm 1 is given by 
𝑀𝑅1 =
𝜕𝑅1
𝜕𝑥1
= 𝑃′(𝑋)𝑥1 + 𝑃(𝑋) > 0. [2.23] 
If firm’s marginal revenue is always decreasing in the other’s output, then the derivative 
of  firm 1’s marginal revenue with respect to 𝑥2 must be negative for every 𝑥2 ≥ 0. 
Formally  
𝜕𝑀𝑅1
𝜕𝑥2
= 𝑃′′(𝑋)𝑥1 + 𝑃′(𝑋) < 0. [2.24] 
Since price is a negative function of aggregate output, 𝑃′(𝑋) < 0. Hence, inequality 
[2.24] certainly holds if 𝑃′′(𝑋)𝑥1 ≤ 0; and since 𝑥1 cannot be negative as it is firm 1’s 
output, it follows that 𝑃′′(𝑋) must be non-positive, i.e., inverse aggregate demand 
function must be decreasing and concave in output. On the contrary, if aggregate demand 
is assumed to be strictly convex, i.e. 𝑃′′(𝑋) > 0, then there may exist an interval of values 
of 𝑥2 such that 
𝜕𝑀𝑅1
𝜕𝑥2
⁄ > 0. 
Therefore the permanent decrease in firm’s marginal revenue with respect to rival’s 
output is not obvious.41 Indeed if we take a constant-elasticity aggregate demand curve 
                                                          
39 Bulow J.I., Geanakoplos J.D. and Klemperer P.D., “Holding capacity to deter entry”, 1985. 
40 Revenue function is assumed to be increasing and concave in firm’s output. 
41 To ensure the concavity of revenue function in firm’s output the following relation must hold: 
𝜕2𝑅1
𝜕2𝑥1
= 𝑃′′(𝑋)𝑥1 + 2𝑃
′(𝑋) < 0, ∀𝑥1 ≥ 0. 
Therefore if aggregate demand is not concave the condition above must be checked in order to verify the 
existence of a maximum of revenue function. 
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𝑃 = 𝑏𝑋−𝛼 – where 𝑏 is a constant parameter and 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 is the constant elasticity of 
aggregate demand – it can be shown that firm 1’s marginal revenue is an increasing 
function of firm 2’s output when 0 ≤ 𝑥2 ≤ 𝛼𝑥1.
42 
Suppose, as in Dixit’s model, firms are characterized by constant marginal cost equal to 
𝑤. It has been shown in 1.4.2., that the slope of firm 1’s reaction function is given by 
𝜙′
1
(𝑥2) = −
𝑃′′(𝑋)𝑥1 + 𝑃
′(𝑋)
𝑃′′(𝑋)𝑥1 + 2𝑃′(𝑋) − 𝐶′′(𝑥1)
. [2.25] 
Since marginal cost is constant, 𝐶′′(𝑥1) = 0. Hence, the denominator in [2.25] is 
essentially the second-order derivative of firm 1’s revenue function with respect to 𝑥1 
(i.e. the derivative of firm 1’s marginal revenue with respect to 𝑥1), while the numerator 
represents the derivative of firm 1’s marginal revenue with respect to 𝑥2. So we get: 
𝜙′
1
(𝑥2) = −
𝜕𝑀𝑅1
𝜕𝑥2
𝜕𝑀𝑅1
𝜕𝑥1
⋚ 0. [2.26] 
By concavity of revenue function in firm’s output, denominator in [2.26] is always 
negative; thus, the sign of the slope of reaction curve depends on the sign of the 
numerator. If we assume a constant-elasticity aggregate demand curve 𝑃 = 𝑏𝑋−𝛼, then 
the slope of reaction curve will be positive until 
𝜕𝑀𝑅1
𝜕𝑥2
> 0, i.e. in the interval 0 ≤ 𝑥2 ≤
𝛼𝑥1, and then it will be negative. Therefore firm 1’s reaction function will be initially 
increasing up to 𝑥2 = 𝛼𝑥1 , and decreasing thereafter; the same applies for firm 2. Figure 
11 should give an intuition of this case. 
                                                          
42 Concavity of firm 1’s revenue function with respect to 𝑥1 is verified in case of aggregate demand with 
constant elasticity. 
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FIG 11 – The shape of reaction curves when firms face a constant 
elasticity aggregate demand curve. 
Let us turn back to Dixit’s model adopting reaction functions of this form. Figure 12 is 
similar to figure 9 except for the shape of reaction curves which, in this case, reflects the 
assumptions of this section. Indeed, as before, 𝑀𝑀′ represents firm 1’s reaction function 
when no pre-commitment capacity has been installed (and capacity cost matters), while 
𝑁𝑁′ represents firm 1’s reaction function when capacity has been already installed (and 
marginal cost is simply 𝑤). 𝑅𝑅′ is firm 2’s reaction curve. 
 
FIG 12 – Post-entry Nash equilibria with the new reaction curves. 
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The chord 𝑇𝑉 represents the set of possible post-entry Nash equilibria, depending, as 
already said, on established firm’s investment decision in the first stage of the game. 
Moreover, by the existence of set-up costs, firm 2’s profit equals zero for an amount of 
firm 1’s output lower than 𝑅′. Let us analyze first the two extreme cases: if 𝜋2(𝑉) > 0, 
as before, entry cannot be deterred, since prospective entrant’s expected profit is greater 
than zero in any post-entry Nash equilibrium; but if 𝜋2(𝑇) < 0 the story change. Now, 
due to the shape of reaction curves, the monopoly output (when capacity cost matters) is 
lower than the lowest established firm’s output consistent with post-entry Nash 
equilibrium set (𝑀1 < 𝑇1). Therefore, 𝑀 = (𝑀1, 0) is not a post-entry Nash equilibrium 
and firm 1 cannot block entry by setting 𝑥1 = 𝑀1.
43 
After that, focus on the intermediate case in which there exists a point 𝐵 = (𝐵1, 𝐵2) along 
the relevant chord such that 𝜋2(𝐵1, 𝐵2) = 0, and suppose that this point lies as in figure 
12. Moreover suppose that established firm finds it better to impede entry, i.e. that 
𝜋1(𝐵) > 𝜋1(𝑆), where 𝜋1(𝑆) is the profit level when entry is allowed and Stackelberg 
solution occurs. Therefore in the first stage established firm will set a limit capacity     
?̅?1 ≅ 𝐵1, but it will not produce the quantity 𝑥1 = ?̅?1; indeed it must solve the constrained 
maximization problem 
max
𝑥1
𝜋1 = 𝑅(𝑥1, 𝑥2) − 𝐹1 − 𝑟1?̅?1 − 𝑤𝑥1 
𝑠. 𝑡.  𝑥1 ≤ ?̅?1. [2.27] 
The Lagrangian function for this problem is 
𝐿(𝑥1, 𝜆) = 𝑅1(𝑥1, 𝑥2) − 𝐹1 − 𝑤𝑥1 − 𝑟?̅?1 + 𝜆(?̅?1 − 𝑥1). 
And the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for this problem are: 
𝜕𝐿
𝜕𝑥1
=
𝜕𝑅1
𝜕𝑥1
− 𝑤 − 𝜆 = 0 [2.28] 
𝜆(?̅?1 − 𝑥1) = 0 [2.29] 
𝜆 ≥ 0. [2.30] 
                                                          
43 Therefore, in order to block entry, we must have 𝜋2(𝑀) < 0. 
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And we have two possible solutions: 
1) 𝜆 = 0. In this case capacity constraint is not binding, i.e. 𝑥1 < ?̅?1, and marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. Therefore this is exactly the monopoly solution 
consistent with point 𝑁 = (𝑁1, 0) in figure 12. 
2) 𝜆 > 0. In this case capacity constraint is binding, i.e. 𝑥1 = ?̅?1, with 𝜆 = 𝑀𝑅1 −
𝑤. This is consistent with the case in which capacity is lower than monopoly 
output and established firm will produce the maximum feasible amount of output. 
In our case ?̅?1 = 𝐵1 > 𝑁1 therefore we are in the first situation, where capacity constraint 
is not binding. Hence established firm will set limit capacity ?̅?1 but it will produce the 
amount of output 𝑁1 < ?̅?1, i.e. we will observe idle capacity. 
Thus, when reaction functions of both firms are not always decreasing in other’s output, 
𝐵1 > 𝑁1,  and established firm finds it better to deter entry than to allow it, we observe 
Spence’s excess capacity and inefficient production, contrary to what was stated by Dixit.  
The result depends essentially on the degree of substitutability between the goods 
produced by firms. Indeed if goods produced by established and prospective entrant firms 
are perfect substitutes, i.e. 
𝜕𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗
⁄ < 0,  then any additional quantity of rival’s output 
reduces firm’s profit and reaction functions will always be decreasing on other’s output. 
In this case established firm will never hold idle capacity.  
However according to Bulow et al., goods are said to be strategic substitutes, if 
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝜕𝑥𝑖
⁄ < 0, i.e. any additional quantity of rival’s output reduces opponent’s 
marginal profit. In this case reaction functions may be increasing in an interval and we 
cannot rule out the possibility of idle capacity for established firm.44 
 
  
                                                          
44 The model has been addressed analyzing the trend of  
𝜕𝑀𝑅1
𝜕𝑥2
⁄ =
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑗
⁄ . However note that  
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑗𝜕𝑥𝑖
=
𝜕2𝜋𝑖
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝜕𝑥𝑗
. 
Therefore nothing changes, and the good can be rightly considered strategic substitutes. 
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Chapter 3 
ENTRY UNDER INCOMPLETE 
INFORMATION 
3.1 Introduction 
The basic idea of limit pricing is that an established firm may be able to influence other’s 
firms’ perceptions of the profitability of entering the market, and that the firm may thus 
set its price below its monopoly profit-maximizing level in order to deter entry. Firm’s 
rationality implies that established firm sets limit price only  if its expected profit when 
entry is allowed is lower than that consistent with the entry-deterring price; and by 
complete information assumption, incumbent firm is able to make this kind of evaluation 
with certainty, while prospective entrant firm can clearly compute its expected profit 
given established firm’s choice. 
Moreover, it has been shown the condition of pre-entry asymmetry between the two firms. 
The prior existence gives a first-mover advantage to the incumbent; as a consequence, if 
entry is accommodated, we will observe a Stackelberg equilibrium with established firm 
acting as the leader firm and the prospective entrant as the follower one.  
Finally, an observation about cost functions of the two firms is required. Indeed, for the 
sake of simplicity, we assumed that firms were symmetric, that is they had the same cost 
function. The only difference concerned the existence of entry-cost for prospective 
entrant firm which clearly influences negatively the possibility to entry, since established 
firm’s entry-deterring output set increases. In this case entrant firm’s reaction curve is 
discontinuous at the level of established firm’s output at which entrant profit equals zero: 
from then on it is better to stay out of the market, and entrant’s output is fixed at zero. 
Similarly, if potential entrant is a large firm that need a large amount of output produced 
and sold in order to earn non-negative profit, its possibilities of entry reduce, as shown in 
Modigliani’s model. All of this refers, in Bain’s terminology, to established firm’s 
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absolute cost advantage over prospective entrant firms, i.e. a beneficial state where an 
incumbent firm is able to achieve and sustain lower average total costs for its products 
or services relative to that achievable by newer entrants.  
However, prospective entrant firm may have a cost advantage over incumbent firm due 
to the fact that it is new. For instance, it may possess a new technology that makes its 
marginal cost lower than that of established firm. In this case prospective entrant firm 
should enter the market relatively more easily and, in the limiting case, it may be able to 
push established firm out of the market. Indeed, consider Dixit’s model and suppose that 
there exist three types of potential entrant firms as shown in figure 13. The heavy lines 
represent the well-known established firm’s reaction curves (when capacity cost matters 
the lower one) while the thin ones are three possible prospective entrant’s reaction curves 
depending on their marginal cost.  
 
FIG 13 – The upward shift of post-entry Nash equilibria in Dixit’s model due 
to the decrease in firm 2’s marginal cost. 
Recall reaction function’s equation 
𝜙𝑖(𝑥𝑗) =
𝑃(𝑋) − 𝐶′𝑖
𝑃′(𝑋)
; [3.1] 
higher reaction curves refer to firms with lower marginal cost; in particular 𝜙2
𝐻is the 
reaction curve of a high-cost prospective entrant, 𝜙2
𝑀 refers to medium-cost entrant, while 
𝜙2
𝐿 to low-cost prospective entrant firm. As we can see in figure 13, the relevant segment 
of post-entry Nash equilibria 𝑇𝑉 shifts up-ward as entrant’s marginal cost decreases. 
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Moreover, for low-cost entrant firms is much more profitable to enter the market than that 
for high one, since the set of post-entry Nash equilibria approaches to entrant’s monopoly 
output. In the limiting case (the correspondent 𝜙2
𝐿 of figure 13), the only Nash equilibrium 
occurs at 𝑥1 = 0 at which prospective entrant produces the monopoly output: in this case, 
the incumbent is pushed out of the market. 
Now suppose established firm does not know prospective entrant’s marginal cost. 
Clearly, it cannot make its capacity choice in the first stage of Dixit’s game, since it does 
not know what is the relevant segment of post-entry Nash equilibria and, therefore, it 
cannot compute if it is in a situation of entry-blocking, if entry cannot be impeded (when 
𝜋2(𝑉) > 0) or if it is better to deter entry setting a limit output/capacity. At the same time, 
if prospective entrant firm is ignorant about established firm’s cost function, it cannot 
make its decision concerning on entering or not the market. Therefore, we need another 
approach in order to analyze oligopolistic entry-barriers in a situation of disinformation 
in which both established and prospective entrant firms are ignorant about other’s cost 
function.  
The purpose of this section is to show a model of entry-barrier with incomplete 
information. 
3.2 Pre-entry price as a Signal 
As already said the role of limit pricing is to influence entrant firms’ perception about the 
profitability of entry in a market. In this context, established firm’s price/output policy 
can be rightly considered as a signal to potential entrants that entry is not profitable. 
Consider for instance, a duopoly entry model in which Sylos’ postulate applies and 
suppose established firm sets limit price in order to deter entry. That limit output/price 
policy conveys an information to potential entrant firm, i.e. that it will earn non-positive 
59 
 
profit if it will come into the market.45 But pre-entry price might convey also information 
to entrant firm about incumbent’s cost function. 
Imagine an established firm with a cost function that is unknown to the potential entrant 
and vice-versa. However, the entrant knows that the other firm’s cost function must be 
among a certain class of cost functions. Now suppose the simplest case in which demand 
function is linear, i.e. 𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑋 with 𝑋 = 𝑥1 + 𝑥2, and cost functions are characterized 
by constant marginal cost; therefore  both firms are uncertain about the value of rival’s 
marginal cost. If established firm does not care about the entry threat, it will set the profit-
maximizing monopoly quantity given by 
max
𝑥1
𝜋1(𝑥1) = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑥1)𝑥1 − 𝑐1𝑥1. [3.2] 
Therefore by first-order condition we get 
𝜕𝜋1
𝜕𝑥1
= 𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑥1 − 𝑐1 = 0  ⇔   𝑥1
𝑚 =
𝑎 − 𝑐1
2𝑏
. [3.3] 
Even if entrant firm does not know established firm’s marginal cost, it can compute 𝑐1 by 
monopolist’s output policy; indeed 𝑐1 = 𝑎 − 2𝑏𝑥1
𝑚. Moreover 𝑥1
𝑚 and 𝑐1 are negatively 
correlated: a high value of 𝑥1
𝑚 (and consequently low monopoly price) refers to a low-
cost firm while a low value of 𝑥1
𝑚 (high monopoly price) refers to high cost firm. 
Therefore if firms are ignorant about rival’s marginal cost, limit price may be interpreted 
by prospective entrant firm as monopoly price of a low-cost established firm. 
Now suppose the entrant can earn non-negative profit if the monopolist has a high 
marginal cost (with respect to its own marginal cost), but it will be forced to suffer losses 
if monopolists marginal cost is low. In this case prospective entrant firm can easily infer 
established firm’s marginal cost and make its decision. But this cannot be an equilibrium 
situation. The incumbent would want to reduce its price (increasing output) in order to 
fool the entrant. But a rational entrant will perceive the possibility of such a strategy. In 
turn, the incumbent knows that the entrant will not be so easily fooled, and so on and so 
forth. 
                                                          
45 We already said that this information, which is a real threat, will not be taken in consideration by 
prospective entrant firm since the sustaining of entry-deterring policy is not credible threat. However also 
capacity choice in Dixit’s model can be interpreted as a signal on the profitability of entry. 
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Two considerations can be made at this point: first, in a context of incomplete information 
the role of limit price is to manipulate information contained in pre-entry price  in order 
to derive benefits later on (signaling game); second, firms make their decisions under 
uncertainty, hence these decisions are sustained by beliefs. This means that possibility of 
mistakes is allowed, and limit price may not limit entry. 
3.3 Signaling Games 
3.3.1 An Intuition 
Signaling games are incomplete information games with two players: a Sender (S) and a 
Receiver (R). The sender has a certain type 𝑡 from a type space 𝑇 = {𝑡1, … … … , 𝑡𝐼}. The 
specific type 𝑡𝑖 is selected by Nature with probability 𝑝(𝑡𝑖). Sender observes 𝑡𝑖 and then 
choose a message 𝑚𝑗 from a message space 𝑀 = {𝑚1, … … … , 𝑚𝐽} to be sent to the 
receiver. The receiver observes the message 𝑚𝑗 but not sender’s type 𝑡𝑖; then he chooses 
an action 𝑎𝑘 from the action space 𝐴 = {𝑎1, … … … , 𝑎𝐾}. Therefore the payoffs for both 
players depend on sender’s type chosen by Nature, on the message sent to the receiver, 
and on the subsequent action of the receiver.  
In signaling games, there may exist pooling equilibria, separating equilibria or both of 
them. The main problem in these games is that typically there exists a multiplicity of 
equilibria. This is a great problem in economic analysis, since different equilibria have 
different implications in economies, especially from a welfare point of view. Multiplicity 
arises from the state of uncertainty in which players are called to act and therefore from 
the fact that players must rely on (rational) expectations, i.e. they have to maximize 
expected payoffs. Expectations take the form of beliefs, that is, of probability distributions 
over different states in which a player is called to play. 
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In order to understand how signaling games work consider the following extensive 
game.46 
 
In this game the sender is player 1 and the receiver is player 2. Sender may be of type I 
and type II (i.e. 𝑇 = {𝐼, 𝐼𝐼}) with probability 𝑝 = 1 2⁄ , that is Nature moves first choosing 
sender’s type according to 𝑝. Then, player 1, knowing his own type, faces the choice 
between Left or Right (i.e. 𝑀 = {𝐿, 𝑅}); after that, player 2 moves, choosing between Up 
and Down (i.e. 𝐴 = {𝑈, 𝐷}. When player 2 chooses, he does not know with certainty the 
real type of player 1, he just observes what player 1’s message; this is depicted in the 
picture by the dashed lines connecting two nodes representing the information sets for 
player 2. Therefore, player 2 makes his decision under uncertainty, since he does not 
know which type of player 1 is facing and, as a consequence, player 1 does not know 
player 2’s move: in this sense, backward induction is unusable in finding a solution to 
this game. 
Indeed in this game players must rely on their beliefs. In this context a system of beliefs 
is defined as a probability distribution over the nodes at every information set. In fact, 
player 2 should have beliefs about the type of player 1 given the message observed. In 
the extensive game, these are 𝑟 = Pr (𝐼|𝐿) and 𝑞 = Pr(𝐼|𝑅). 
Clearly this system of beliefs cannot be just anything: it must be constructed following 
Bayes’ rule. The essence of Bayesian approach is to provide a mathematical rule 
                                                          
46 The game is essentially a remake of “quiche or beer” game introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987). 
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explaining how one should change his/her existing beliefs in the light of new evidence. 
Mathematically, given an event 𝐴1 and a subsequent event 𝐵, Bayes’ rule states that 
Pr(𝐴1|𝐵) =
Pr(𝐵|𝐴1) Pr (𝐴1)
Pr (𝐵)
, 
[3.4] 
where Pr(𝐴1|𝐵) is defined as the posterior probability, i.e. the probability that event 𝐴1 
occurs when the subsequent event 𝐵 is observed; Pr(𝐵|𝐴1) is defined as the likelihood; 
Pr (𝐴1) is the prior probability that event 𝐴1 occurs; while Pr(𝐵) = ∑ Pr(𝐵|𝐴𝑖) Pr (𝐴𝑖)𝑖   
is a normalizing constant called marginal likelihood. 
Hence, since the beliefs must be consistent with Bayes’ rule, then in our game 𝑟 and 𝑞 
must be such that 
𝑟 ≡ Pr(𝐼|𝐿) =
Pr(𝐿|𝐼) Pr (𝐼)
Pr(𝐿|𝐼) Pr(𝐼) + Pr(𝐿|𝐼𝐼) Pr (𝐼𝐼)
 , [3.5𝑎] 
𝑞 ≡ Pr(𝐼|𝑅) =
Pr(𝑅|𝐼) Pr (𝐼)
Pr(𝑅|𝐼) Pr(𝐼) + Pr(𝑅|𝐼𝐼) Pr (𝐼𝐼)
. [3.6𝑎] 
Pr (𝐼) is exactly the probability by which Nature chooses player 1’s type; thus Pr(𝐼) = 𝑝. 
Now, following the extensive game described above, define Pr(𝐿|𝐼) = 𝑎 and Pr(𝐿|𝐼𝐼) =
𝑏.47 Hence in our game 𝑟 and 𝑞 are such that 
𝑟 =
𝑎𝑝
𝑎𝑝 + 𝑏(1 − 𝑝)
, [3.5𝑏] 
𝑞 =
(1 − 𝑎)𝑝
(1 − 𝑎)𝑝 + (1 − 𝑏)(1 − 𝑝)
 . [3.6𝑏] 
Now we can introduce the concepts of both sequential rationality and perfect Bayes-Nash 
equilibrium. 
Definition 1. A mixed strategy 𝑠𝑖 is sequentially rational for player 𝑖 if there does not 
exist a deviation 𝑠′𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 that strictly increases utility 𝑢𝑖 of player 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁, given a system 
of beliefs 𝑏𝑖 at any information set ℎ𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑖 of player 𝑖; that is 
                                                          
47 Note that 𝑎 represents the probability that player 1 chooses left when he is of type 𝐼. Hence 𝑎 is essentially 
the mixed strategy of playing left for player 1 when he is of type 𝐼. Therefore prior beliefs are derived from 
player 1’s mixed strategy;  this fact is essential in the definition of Perfect Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of the 
next page. 
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𝑢𝑖
ℎ𝑖(𝑠𝑖|𝑏𝑖) ≥ 𝑢𝑖
ℎ𝑖(𝑠′𝑖|𝑏𝑖), 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙  𝑠′𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙𝑙 ℎ𝑖 ∈ 𝐻𝑖. 
Definition 2. A profile of mixed strategies48 and a system of beliefs constitute a perfect 
Bayes-Nash equilibrium if and only if: 
1. The strategy profile is sequentially rational given the system of beliefs49; 
2. The system of beliefs is derived from the profile of mixed strategies by Bayes’ 
rule whenever possible (i.e. at every information set that is reachable with 
positive probability). 
In signaling games there are two opposite types of equilibria:50 pooling equilibria and 
separating equilibria. They are defined as follow. 
Definition 3. A pooling equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all types of sender send 
the same message. 
Definition 4. A separating equilibrium is an equilibrium in which all types of sender send 
different messages. 
Let us find first separating equilibria in our game. In this case if player 1 type 𝐼 chooses 
Left than type 𝐼𝐼 will choose Right and vice-versa. Now consider this case. Player 1 
chooses with certainty Left if he is of type 𝐼, i.e. he chooses Left when he observes type 
𝐼 with probability 1: that is Pr(𝐿|𝐼) = 𝑎 = 1. While, observing type 𝐼𝐼 he chooses Right 
with probability 1, i.e. Pr(𝑅|𝐼) = 𝑏 = 0. Recalling that Nature moves with probability 
𝑝 = 1 2⁄ , the player 2’s system of beliefs is given by 𝑟 = 1 and 𝑞 = 0. This means that 
player 2 knows exactly in which node he is called to move (like a complete information 
game); that is, he recognizes the real type of the sender. Therefore player 2 will always 
play Up in order maximize his utility. 
Now define this profile of strategies for the two players as ((𝐿, 𝑅), (𝑈, 𝑈)). In order to be 
a Nash equilibrium, we have to provide that (𝐿, 𝑅) is a best response for player 1 to 
                                                          
48 A profile of (mixed) strategies (or strategy profile) is a set of (mixed) strategies for all players which 
fully specifies the actions of the game. A strategy profile must include one and only one strategy for every 
player. 
49 That is sequential rationality specified in definition 1 applies to every 𝑖 ∈ 𝑁. 
50 With more than two types of senders there might also exist equilibria where some types choose the same 
message and some types choose to send different messages. These are called semi-separating equilibria. 
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(𝑈, 𝑈). And indeed there is no other strategy that gives a greater expected payoff to player 
1 given the player 2’s strategy (𝑈, 𝑈).  
Therefore, defining 𝑁 as the set of perfect Bayes-Nash equilibria, we have that: 
((𝐿, 𝑅), (𝑈, 𝑈)) ∈ 𝑁. [3.7] 
The same kind of considerations can be made in the opposite case of separating 
equilibrium, in which player 1 chooses Right when he is of type 𝐼 and Left when he is of 
type 𝐼𝐼. In this case 𝑟 = 0 and 𝑞 = 1, and as before player 2 recognizes the real type of 
player 1. In order to maximize his utility he will choose strategy (𝐷, 𝐷) and player 1’s 
best response to player 2’s strategy will be exactly (𝑅, 𝐿); hence 
((𝑅, 𝐿), (𝐷, 𝐷)) ∈ 𝑁. [3.8] 
In pooling equilibria player 1 chooses Left or Right regardless of his type. Consider first 
the case where both types choose Left. As before, this can be described saying that both 
types of player 1 play Left with probability equal to 1, that is 𝑎 = 1 and 𝑏 = 1. Hence, in 
this case 𝑟 = 1 2⁄  while 𝑞 cannot be computed.
51 The intuition behind this result is the 
following: since all types signal the same, the receiver is not able to recognize real 
sender’s type with certainty, i.e. player 2 does not know clearly in which node of the game 
he is called to move. This is evident if one notes that posterior probability 𝑟 equals prior 
probability 𝑝. 
Now let us compute the expected payoff for player 2 when Left is observed. He gains 2 
playing Up and 4 playing Down: therefore he will play D. Now, looking at this result, one 
might think that ((𝐿, 𝐿), (𝐷, 𝐷)) is a perfect Bayes-Nash equilibrium. But (𝐿, 𝐿) is not a 
best response to (𝐷, 𝐷) since player 1 may increase his expected payoff separating, i.e. 
applying strategy (𝑅, 𝐿); hence this cannot be an equilibrium. However, (𝐿, 𝐿) is a best 
response to player 2’s strategy (𝐷, 𝑈), since there is no other strategy that strictly 
increases player 1’s payoff. Now we require that player 2 effectively chooses Up when 
observing Right. Clearly, player 2 will choose Up in face of Right only if his expected 
payoff is greater than the one if he plays Down. Therefore we require that 
                                                          
51 Indeed substituting 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 1 in the equation of 𝑞 we get 𝑞 =
0
0
. 
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8𝑞 < 4(1 − 𝑞)  ⇔   𝑞 <
1
3
 . [3.9] 
Hence if 𝑞 < 1 3⁄  player 2 finds it better to apply strategy (𝐷, 𝑈). This means essentially 
that strategy (𝐷, 𝑈) is sustained by the belief that, observing right, it is more likely that 
player 1 is of type 𝐼𝐼. Therefore for 𝑟 = 1 2⁄  and 𝑞 <
1
3⁄ , 
((𝐿, 𝐿), (𝐷, 𝑈)) ∈ 𝑁. [3.10] 
If 𝑞 > 1 3⁄  then player 2 finds it better to apply strategy  (𝐷, 𝐷) than applying (𝐷, 𝑈) and 
player 1 has convenience to separate, i.e. no pooling equilibrium will be observed. 
The same sort of considerations can be made when player 1 applies pooling strategy 
(𝑅, 𝑅). In this case both 𝑎 = 𝑏 = 0, 𝑞 = 1 2⁄  while 𝑟 cannot be computed. Hence, 
observing Right player 2 chooses Down given belief 𝑞 = 1 2⁄ . However, (𝑅, 𝑅) is a best 
response to player 2’s strategy (𝑈, 𝐷), then in order to have an equilibrium we require 
that player 2 chooses Up when observing Right. Thus, we require that  
4𝑟 > 8(1 − 𝑟)  ⇔ 𝑟 >
2
3
. [3.11] 
When 𝑟 > 2 3⁄  player 2 applies strategy (𝑈, 𝐷). In this case, strategy (𝑈, 𝐷) is sustained 
by the belief that, observing Left, it is more likely that player 1 is of type 𝐼. Therefore for 
𝑟 > 2 3⁄  and 𝑞 =
1
2⁄ , 
((𝑅, 𝑅), (𝑈, 𝐷)) ∈ 𝑁. [3.12] 
Similarly as before, if 𝑟 < 2 3⁄  then player 2 finds it better to apply strategy  (𝐷, 𝐷) than 
applying (𝑈, 𝐷) and player 1 has convenience to separate, i.e. no pooling equilibrium will 
be observed. 
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3.3.2 Spence’s Job Market Signaling 
The first application of signaling games in economics was Michael Spence’s model “Job 
market signaling” (1973). In the model, Spence developed a game where a community of 
jobless people faces one employer. The community is divided into two groups based on 
individual productivity: in Group I there are people with low productivity52 and in Group 
II people with high productivity.  The employer is willing to offer a greater salary to 
people with high productivity than that to people with low productivity. The problem is 
that “in the most job markets the employer is not sure of the productive capabilities of an 
individual at the time he hires him.[…] The fact that these capabilities are not known 
beforehand makes (investment) a decision under uncertainty”(Spence, 1973 p. 356). 
It is assumed that the employer cannot observe potential employees’ productivity with 
certainty. However, there are many information that the employer can consider in order 
to evaluate potential employees. Spence distinguished between unalterable attributes 
defined as indices (sex, age, race etc.), while reserving the term signals for those 
observable characteristics attached to the individual that are subject to manipulation by 
him.  
From the set of possible signals Spence focused on education, that is to a higher education 
should have corresponded a higher productive capabilities to work53. Clearly, education 
is costly, not only in terms of money, but mostly in terms of opportunity costs (time, 
physic fatigue, etc.); Spence defined these costs as signaling costs. 
The critical assumption of the model is that signaling costs are negatively correlated with 
productive capability; that is, for a certain level of education people with lower 
capabilities have to sustain higher costs than those with higher capabilities 
Hence the model describes a situation of incomplete information where the employer can 
only observe with certainty the level of education. Since education in negatively 
correlated to potential employee’s capability, and at the same time higher education is a 
signal of higher capability (i.e. a higher wage gained), the problem for employees consists 
in acquiring a level of education that maximizes the difference between wage and 
education costs; on the other hand, employer generates a system of beliefs that must be 
                                                          
52 Productivity is defined in terms of capability to perform the specific job offered by employer. 
53 Another implicit assumption is that the process of education does not improve individual capability. 
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Bayes’ consistent, and offers wage schedules given such beliefs. Thus in this signaling 
game the employer is the Receiver while potential employees are Senders. 
Under different systems of beliefs, Spence provided the existence of separating or 
pooling equilibria. In separating equilibrium high capability group signal a different level 
of education (in particular a higher level of education) than the low capability group; such 
equilibrium arises when the reward of being recognized with high capability is greater 
than low capability group payoff and, at the same time, education cost for low capability 
group is too high. Hence it must be the case that 
𝑢𝐻 − 𝑐𝐻 ≥ 𝑢𝐿 ≥ 𝑢𝐻 − 𝑐𝐿 , 
where 𝑢𝐻 is high capability individual’s payoff; 𝑐𝐻 is education cost for high capability 
type; 𝑢𝐿 is low capability individual’s payoff; and 𝑐𝐿 is education cost for low type, such 
that 𝑐𝐻 < 𝑐𝐿. If such condition does not hold, then one of the two group may have an 
incentive not to separate, that is to declare the same as the other group. In this case we 
will observe a pooling equilibrium. 
3.4 Milgrom and Roberts’ Model 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) designed a model of entry barriers with incomplete 
information where both established and potential entrant firms are ignorant about other’s 
(constant) marginal cost, while all the other features of the market are common 
knowledge. It is a two-period model: in first period, which can be called the pre-entry 
period, established firm chooses its output/price policy in face of entry; in second period, 
i.e. the post-entry period, firms compete in Cournot duopoly if potential firm enters the 
market; otherwise incumbent enjoys pure monopoly. Established firm will choose the 
price/output policy that maximize the sum between pre-entry period profit and discounted 
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post-entry period profit, while prospective entrant firm will come into the market if its 
expected profit is nonnegative. The main assumption of the model concerns post-entry 
period: if potential firm enters the market, then both firms immediately know rival’s 
marginal cost and Cournot-Nash equilibrium is reached. Therefore uncertainty concerns 
only the first period of the model. 
As already said, if the incumbent acts naively, i.e. it ignores the threat of entry, 
prospective entrant firm is able to infer incumbent’s marginal cost making its decision of 
entry with certainty; knowing this, established firm will try to fool the rival, changing 
pre-entry price/output policy to its own advantage.  
The model is essentially a signaling game and, therefore, it must be seen as one of the 
applications of signaling games to economic problems started with Spence’s work in 
1973. Here established firm acts as the Sender, and the prospective entrant firm as the 
Receiver. In fact established firm has a certain type, i.e. a certain marginal cost, inside the 
type space, i.e. the set of feasible marginal costs in industry. Nature moves first choosing 
a type of established firm with a given probability. Prospective entrant firm can only 
observe the message, that is pre-entry output/price policy, but it cannot observe other’s 
marginal cost. In this model signaling costs consist in the loss deriving from the 
application of a price different from monopoly price, in the first period. That is, let ?̂? 
equilibrium pre-entry price and 𝑝𝑚 monopoly price, then signaling cost is given by 
𝜋(𝑝𝑚) − 𝜋(?̂?). 
The importance of cost advantage has been shown in section 3.1: firms with low marginal 
costs are characterized by high reaction curves, which in turn affect post-entry 
equilibrium in a situation much more profitable for the low cost firm. Here comes the 
importance of understanding the real value of incumbent’s marginal cost for prospective 
entrant firm and vice-versa.  
As in all signaling games, we will observe a (large) multiplicity of equilibria, both pooling 
and separating. This is a first limit of the model that, however, refers all models with a 
degree of uncertainty. Hence in their analysis, Milgrom and Roberts concentrate on 
specific families of equilibria that are relevant in their results, and provides the existence 
of Bayes- consistent beliefs that sustain such equilibria. In this context, Milgrom and 
Roberts’ modus operandi is polar to that of Spence. 
Another limit of the model concerns time horizon. Since established firm maximizes its 
profits over two period, then if entry is deterred it enjoys pure monopoly profit since no 
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entry is allowed. This has consequences on the trend of equilibrium price with important 
consequences for social welfare. 
Suppose established firm deters successfully entry through a first period limit pricing 
strategy. In this model, when entry is no more threatened, the incumbent sets the 
monopoly output, and the respective price emerges. Therefore, limit price is not 
maintained indefinitely, but it is set with the precise purpose of impeding entry, and then 
price rises up to the monopoly level. This approach appears incoherent with standard limit 
price theory so far discussed in which entry-preventing price is assumed to be maintained 
indefinitely. This problem has a clear implication in welfare analysis on entry barriers. 
Assuming that the monopoly output is the worst situation for social welfare, in complete 
information models entry-preventing price is typically higher than that when entry is 
accommodated, but is surely lower than monopoly price54; therefore the simple threat of 
entry has a positive social welfare effect de facto; if entry occurs, industry enjoys typically 
a Stackelberg equilibrium price while, if entry is deterred, the limit price lower than the 
monopoly one. On the contrary, in Milgrom and Roberts entry has surely a short-run 
effect by lowering first period price; but if entry is deterred, then price rises immediately 
to the initial monopoly level.55 
However, despite its limits, Milgrom and Robert’s model on entry barriers is a 
fundamental work on entry barriers.  
First because they provided an analysis where oligopolistic firms are not open boxes in 
which anyone can take a look realizing with certainty how they work. This is of great 
relevance if one considers that firms typically do everything possible to ensure that no 
one outside firms can understand their functioning. And if the competition is between 
established and potential entrant firms, then it is really hard to believe that incumbent is 
able to see the mechanism of a firm which is just potential, unless it already operates in 
another (observable) market. 
Second, the authors clarify the reason why established firms can discourage entry by 
charging a low pre-entry price, that is how low prices could deter entry.  
                                                          
54 In this context we are referring to the case of entry effectively impeded, and not to entry blockaded. Indeed 
in the last case the simple monopoly policy is sufficient to deter entry, and monopoly price is maintained.  
55 This approach is coherent with what suggested by Osborne (1973) for which the more profitable strategy 
for established firm might be “to reduce the price when entry threat is imminent and raise it when the threat 
has subsided.” 
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One possibility is that the price of established firm has a commitment value, i.e. entrants 
expect that pre-entry price will prevail after entry. In Modigliani (1958) this assumption 
is enclosed in Sylos’ postulate, and it has been already shown that is not a credible threat. 
Moreover, as Tirole (1988) has pointed out, entry into markets is a decision that covers a 
period of many months or years, whereas a price can often be changed within few days 
or weeks. Consequently, any loss that a potential entrant may suffer from a low pre-entry 
price is negligible. Another possibility, provided by Dixit (1980), is that low pre-entry 
price is related to high pre-entry capacity. But in that case, the source of entry barrier is 
incumbent’s capacity rather than its price. 
Milgrom and Roberts intervened in the debate clarifying the role of low pre-entry price. 
In fact in their model, pre-price incorporates information about market profitability for 
potential entrants. In particular, by the positive relationship between pre-entry price and 
established firm’s cost function, low price conveys bad news to potential entrants, in the 
sense that it signals the high degree of competitiveness of established firm. In this context 
Milgrom and Roberts’ contribution can be considered as another way in order to 
overcome Sylos’ postulate, since the two authors demonstrated the existence of 
equilibrium strategies in which established firms set prices lower than the profit-
maximizing ones without assuming that potential entrants take the output of incumbents 
as given. 
Finally, Milgrom and Roberts’ model shows that limit pricing strategy occurs in a 
situation of incomplete information too, but at the same time it may not limit entry. 
Indeed, by the existence of many equilibria, in some of them limit prices will emerge 
without, however, deterring entry. In this sense, limit price is not always successful, with 
all the consequences from the standpoint of a welfare analysis on entry barriers. 
3.4.2 A Simplified Model 
Let us give a simplified version of Milgrom and Roberts’ model that contains many of 
the relevant features.56 It is a two-period game with one established firm (firm 1) and one 
                                                          
56 This analysis follows Fundeberg and Tirole’s (1986) contribution. 
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prospective entrant (firm2): in first period, the monopolist chooses a price57 𝑝1; in second 
period firm 2 observes 𝑝1 and decides whether to enter the market or not. All the relevant 
parameters of industry (such as aggregate demand and cost functions) are common 
knowledge but firms’ marginal costs. In particular cost functions of both firms are 
characterized by constant marginal cost, i.e. 𝐶𝑖(𝑥𝑖) = 𝑐𝑖𝑥𝑖 with 𝑖 = 1,2. Moreover, if firm 
2 comes into the market, both firms immediately recognize other’s marginal cost. 
First, let us focus on prospective entrant firm’s decision in second stage. In this simplified 
model, established firm’s marginal cost 𝑐1 can take two values 𝑐1 and 𝑐1, with 𝑐1 > 𝑐1, 
each with probability 1 2⁄ .
58 Firm 2’s profit, net of entry cost, is 𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1) or  𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1), and 
zero if it does not enter.59 To have a non-trivial problem assume that  
𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1) < 0 < 𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1), [3.13] 
i.e. if entrant firm has complete information, it would enter only if the incumbent has high 
cost. Moreover, assume that without any market information, entrant firm would want to 
enter. Assuming risk neutrality, this implies that 
1
2
(𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1) + 𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1)) > 0. [3.14] 
Finally, let 𝜋1(𝑝1) and 𝜋1(𝑝1) denote respectively the high cost and the low cost 
incumbent’s first period profit function60; and let 𝛿𝜋1
𝑚
 and 𝛿𝜋1
𝑑
 denote the high cost 
incumbent’s discounted second period profit when it is in a situation of monopoly or 
duopoly (the same for low cost firm) such that 𝜋1
𝑚
> 𝜋1
𝑑
. 
Now assume that established firm behaves naively, i.e. it ignores the threat of entry; it 
chooses the monopoly price in the first period 𝑝1
𝑚 or 𝑝
1
𝑚
 depending if it has low costs or 
high costs, and such that 𝑝
1
𝑚
> 𝑝1
𝑚. In this case prospective entrant firm can infer firm 
                                                          
57 Therefore we concentrate on price and not on quantity. However firms compete in the second stage on 
quantities, thus firms cannot choose directly the price, which is rather the result of output choices. 
58 Indeed, the game of incomplete information is replaced by a game of complete but imperfect information 
through Harsanyi’s transformation, in which Nature moves first selecting 𝑐1 or 𝑐1 according to the given 
probability. 
59 Common knowledge variables have been omitted in the definition of firm 2’ profit. 
60 It is increasing and concave in firm’s output. 
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1’s marginal cost; then it will enter if 𝑝1 = 𝑝1
𝑚
. High cost established firm will be willing 
to fool prospective entrant firm (and sacrifice first period monopoly profit) only if 
𝜋1
𝑚
+ 𝛿𝜋1
𝑑
< 𝜋1(𝑝1
𝑚) + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑚
; [3.15] 
i.e. only if the sum of first period monopoly profit and second-period discounted duopoly 
profit is lower than the sum of first period profit when firm 1 pretends to be a low cost 
firm and second-period discounted monopoly profit. 
Now consider rational firms. The monopolist chooses a first period price that depends on 
its cost: 𝑝1(𝑐1). Then the entrant observes 𝑝1 and forms beliefs about 𝑐1. Let 𝑞(𝑝1) be the 
posterior probability that established firm has low cost associated to firm 2’s beliefs (and 
𝑞(𝑝1) = 1 − 𝑞(𝑝1) the probability that established firm has high cost). We require such 
probability distribution be Bayes-consistent with monopolist strategy on 𝑝1. Then 
prospective entrant firm will compare  
𝑞(𝑝1)𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1) + 𝑞(𝑝1)𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1) ≶ 0 [3.16] 
in order to decide whether to enter or not. Therefore established firm can influence firm 
2’ entry choice through 𝑝1. We then require 𝑝1 to be intertemporally optimal for the 
incumbent given its cost and prospective entrant’s reaction to 𝑝1. 
Thus, this is basically a signaling game and there can be two regimes of equilibria: 
a) Pooling equilibria: monopoly’s price in unrelated to 𝑐1 and every firm 
declares the same; 
b) Separating equilibria: different types of monopolists charge different prices 
in order to be recognized. 
To find a perfect Bayesian equilibrium we consider a particular regime, compute entrant 
firm’s belief associated with chosen regime and check that different types of monopolists 
want to behave consistently with this regime. 
a) Pooling equilibrium: in this case monopoly’s price does not depend on 𝑐1 and 
prospective entrant firm has no information about monopolist’s marginal cost 
function. Therefore firm 2’s posterior probability distribution after observing 
𝑝1 is 𝑞(𝑝1) = 𝑞(𝑝1) =
1
2⁄  and prospective entrant comes into the market. 
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But each type of monopolist would then prefer (strictly prefer for at least one 
type) playing its first period monopoly price since it cannot impede entry and 
at the same time, it is not maximizing its first period profit. Hence, firms set 
different prices; therefore there cannot exist a pooling equilibrium. 
b) Separating equilibrium: in this case 𝑝1 is related to 𝑐1. Here there are two 
necessary conditions: first, each type of established firm wants to be 
distinguished by entrant firm, therefore low-cost type does not want to pick 
high-cost type’s equilibrium price and vice-versa; second that the separating 
equilibrium price correspond to a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 
Let 𝑝
1
 and  𝑝1 denote high and low cost incumbent’s first period equilibrium 
price. The entrant comes into the market if it observes 𝑝
1
. If established firm 
is a high-cost type, it will set its monopoly price 𝑝
1
𝑚
 since this price maximizes 
high-cost incumbent’s first period profit and cannot induce more entry than 
𝑝
1
 does. Hence firm 2 enters when observing high cost pre-entry price 𝑝
1
=
𝑝
1
𝑚
 and firm 1 payoff will be 𝜋1
𝑚
+ 𝛿𝜋1
𝑑
. This strategy is an equilibrium for 
high-cost type if this payoff is greater than that when entry is deterred and 
equals 𝜋1(𝑝1) + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑚
. Hence, 
𝜋1
𝑚
+ 𝛿𝜋1
𝑑
≥ 𝜋1(𝑝1) + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑚
⇔ 
⇔ 𝜋1
𝑚
− 𝜋1(𝑝1) ≥ 𝛿(𝜋1
𝑚
− 𝜋1
𝑑
). 
[3.17] 
Similarly, the low-cost type must be maximizing its profit by choosing 𝑝1. In 
this case, if established firm charges its monopoly price it will get at worst 
𝜋1
𝑚 + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑑  (i.e. at worst it induce entry). Hence, in order to be an equilibrium, 
price for low-cost incumbent 𝑝1 must be such that 
𝜋1
𝑚 + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑑 ≤ 𝜋1(𝑝1) + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑚  ⇔  
⇔  𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1(𝑝1) ≤ 𝛿(𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑). 
[3.18] 
These two conditions define and interval of equilibrium values for 𝑝1: denote 
this set of equilibrium prices for low-cost established firm as 𝐸; hence 𝑝1 ∈ 𝐸. 
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However, in order to specify this set, we need additional assumptions on 
second-period duopoly outcomes, which in turn are affected by the 
assumptions on demand and cost function. Let us skip for the moment this 
issue, and demonstrate that such price really constitutes an equilibrium. 
In order to do this, suppose that high-cost incumbent does not choose 𝑝
1
𝑚
 and 
that low-cost one does not choose 𝑝1 ∈ 𝐸. When a price that differs from these 
two is observed, prospective entrant firm is facing an unexpected event and 
Bayes’ rule does not pin down firm 2’s posterior belief. In order to 
demonstrate that equilibrium prices are best response for firm 1, we choose 
the worst situation for the incumbent firm and verify that it will not deviate 
from equilibrium prices. 
Therefore, concentrate on the most aggressive situation in which entrant firm 
strongly believes that incumbent is a high cost firm, i.e. 𝑞(𝑝1) = 0; doing so, 
prospective entrant comes into the market with certainty. Now, let us check 
that no incumbent type wants to deviate from equilibrium prices. Indeed, high 
cost firm is not willing to lose its first period monopoly price choosing another 
price that induces entry anyhow. Similarly for low-cost established firm, since 
there is no possibility to deter entry it will not deviate from its equilibrium 
price set since for every 𝑝1 ∉ 𝐸, 𝜋1
𝑚 > 𝜋1(𝑝1).
61 
Now we can analyze the set of equilibrium prices for low-cost established firm. Indeed 
𝑝1 must satisfy both [3.17] and [3.18]: let 𝑝 denote the level of 𝑝1 that satisfies [3.17] 
with equality, and 𝑝 the one that satisfies [3.18] with equality. At this point, let us define 
the two functions 
𝑦 = 𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1(𝑝1) [3.19] 
𝑧 = 𝛿(𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑) [3.20] 
in the space (𝑦, 𝑝1); the following picture should give a suggestion of these two functions. 
                                                          
61 Recall that  𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1(𝑝1) ≤ 𝛿(𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑)  if 𝑝1 ∈ 𝐸. Since entry cannot be deterred, the right-hand side 
of the inequality is equal to zero and 𝜋1
𝑚 = 𝜋1(𝑝1). On the contrary, if 𝑝1 ∉ 𝐸 then 𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1(𝑝1) > 0; 
therefore 𝜋1
𝑚 > 𝜋1(𝑝1). 
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FIG 14 – The set of equilibrium prices in separating equilibrium. (Source: Tirole, 1988) 
Figure 14 represents both functions 𝑦 and 𝑧 for high and low cost firm 1. The two function 
𝑦 are decreasing up to monopoly price and increasing thereafter. But let us focus on the 
two types of function 𝑧. In particular we should understand if (𝜋1
𝑚
− 𝜋1
𝑑
) ≶
(𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑); i.e., we should understand the trend of 𝑧 with respect to 𝑐1; that is  
𝜕𝑧
𝜕 𝑐1
≡
𝜕(𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑)
𝜕 𝑐1
=
𝜕𝜋1
𝑚
𝜕𝑐1
−
𝜕𝜋1
𝑚
𝜕𝑐1
⋚ 0. [3.21] 
Let us find the sign of this derivative using envelope theorem. Indeed 𝜋1
𝑚 is given by the 
solution of monopolist’s maximization problem, and can be defined as 𝜋1
𝑚 =
𝑓(𝑥1
𝑚( 𝑐1), 𝑐1) where 𝑥1
𝑚 is the argmax of 𝜋1
𝑚; while 𝜋1
𝑑 is the profit given by the 
maximization in duopoly, which can be define as 𝜋1
𝑑 = 𝑔(𝑥1
𝑑(𝑐1, 𝑐2), 𝑥2
𝑑(𝑐1, 𝑐2), 𝑐1) 
where 𝑥1
𝑑 maximizes 𝜋1
𝑑 given 𝑥2
𝑑. By the envelope theorem we have that 
𝜕𝜋1
𝑚
𝜕𝑐1
=
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝑐1
, [3.22𝑎] 
𝜕 𝜋1
𝑑
𝜕𝑐1
=
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑐1
+
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑  
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑
𝜕𝑐1
. [3.23𝑎] 
Since marginal cost is assumed to be constant, it follows that 
𝜕𝜋1
𝑚
𝜕𝑐1
= −𝑥1
𝑚, [3.22𝑏] 
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𝜕 𝜋1
𝑑
𝜕𝑐1
= −𝑥1
𝑑 +
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑  
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑
𝜕𝑐1
. [3.23𝑏] 
Where 𝑥1
𝑚 is the monopoly output while 𝑥1
𝑑 is firm 1’s duopoly output. Moreover the 
term 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑  
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑
𝜕𝑐1
 is negative.62 Finally we get 
𝜕(𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑)
𝜕 𝑐1
= −𝑥1
𝑚 − (
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑  
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑
𝜕𝑐1
− 𝑥1
𝑑) < 0 ⇔  𝑥1
𝑚 > 𝑥1
𝑑 +
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑  
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑
𝜕𝑐1
. [3.24] 
If the inequality holds, function 𝑧 is decreasing in marginal cost63; therefore, as in figure 
14, (𝜋1
𝑚
− 𝜋1
𝑑
) < (𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑). 
Suppose to be in this case as shown in figure 14. The intersection between curves 𝑦 and 
𝑧 for each level of cost, represents the boundaries of equilibrium price levels for low cost 
incumbent firm. Indeed for every 𝑝1 > 𝑝  ⇒ 𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1(𝑝1) < 𝛿(𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑), while for 
every 𝑝1 < 𝑝 ⇒ 𝜋1
𝑚
− 𝜋1(𝑝1) > 𝛿(𝜋1
𝑚
− 𝜋1
𝑑
); thus 𝐸 = [𝑝, 𝑝] and 𝑝1 ∈ [𝑝, 𝑝]. 
Now some consideration about 𝐸 = [𝑝, 𝑝] is required. Indeed, even if every 𝑝1 ∈ [𝑝, 𝑝] 
is in principle an equilibrium price for low-cost established firm, surely firm 1 will choose 
the equilibrium price closest to its monopoly price in order to maximize its profit in the 
first period. This is true if we assume, as we have always done so far, that firms’ profit 
function is increasing and concave, with maximum at the monopoly price/output. 
In this context, low-cost firm’s monopoly price may or may not belong to the set of 
equilibrium prices. This depends on the gap between the cost of high and low-type firm, 
which in turn affects the gap of the two monopoly prices. However if the two types are 
taken sufficiently different each other, 𝑝1
𝑚 does not belong to 𝐸 as in figure 14; therefore 
low-cost firm 1 will choose 𝑝, i.e. low cost firm will charge the highest 𝑝1 such that the 
high-cost type’s first period loss of charging 𝑝1 exceeds its gain from deterring entry. 
                                                          
62 Indeed  under regular conditions, 
𝜕𝑔
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑 < 0, since firm 1’s profit decreases if firm 2’s equilibrium output 
increases, while 
𝜕𝑥2
𝑑
𝜕𝑐1
> 0, since firm 2’s equilibrium output usually increases with respect to firm 1’s 
marginal cost. 
63 The sign depends essentially on the assumption we made about demand function, and on the amount of 
marginal costs. 
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Hence in order to separate and be recognized as a low-cost type, established firm will set 
a limit price. 
3.4.3 The model with an interval of continuous values of 𝒄𝟏 
Let us concentrate on the model of entry-barrier with complete information developed by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1982) in which, instead of being only two possible values of 
marginal cost, both for established and prospective entrant firms there exists an interval 
[𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑖] with 𝑖 = 1,2 of possible values of marginal costs. Each firm knows the interval in 
which its rival’s marginal cost lies but ignores the exact value. Firms produce identical 
products whose inverse demand function is supposed to be linear, i.e. 𝑃 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑋.  
Let us recall the main features of the model. It is a two-period game in which: in the first 
period, established firm chooses its output/price policy; prospective entrant firm, after 
observing firm’s one choice, decides whether to enter the market or not. If it enters, both 
firms recognize other’s marginal cost and compete on quantities, reaching a Cournot 
equilibrium. Knowing that both firms have cost functions characterized by constant 
marginal cost, discounted profit functions can be constructed, starting at the second 
period. If firm 2 does not enter, then firm 1 is a simple monopolist facing no entry threat 
in the second period, with profit equal to  
𝜋1
𝑚 =
(𝑎 − 𝑐1)
2
4𝑏
  𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑥1
𝑚 =
𝑎 − 𝑐1
2𝑏
. 
If firm 2 enters, the two firms choose Cournot equilibrium output levels with certainty, 
since they know other’s marginal cost. Thus, their second-period profits are 
𝜋𝑖
𝑐(𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑗) =
(𝑎 − 2𝑐𝑖 + 𝑐𝑗)
2
9𝑏
. 
Therefore, once entry decision is made, the rest of the play is determined with certainty. 
Since firm 2 observes first period output of firm 1 before making its entry decision, firm 
2’s choice can be written as 𝑣(𝑐2, 𝑥1) where only two values of 𝑣 are possible:  
𝑣(𝑐2, 𝑥1) = 1 if firm 2 enters, and 𝑣(𝑐2, 𝑥1) = 0 if it does not enter. 
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Recalling that when firm 1 chooses its first period output it is ignorant of 𝑐2, and when 
firm 2 decides whether or not to enter the market it is ignorant of 𝑐1, let 𝐻2(𝑐2) be the 
probability distribution that firm 1 supposes for 𝑐2, and let 𝐻1(𝑐1) be the distribution that 
firm 2 supposes for 𝑐1.
64 Moreover, letting 𝜂(𝑐1) be firm 1’s first period output choice as 
a function of 𝑐1, expected established firm’s discounted profit is given by 
Π1(𝑐1, 𝐸(𝑐2)) = 𝜋1(𝜂(𝑐1), 𝑐1) + 
+𝛿 ∫ {𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)𝑣(𝑐2, 𝜂(𝑐1)) + 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1)[1 − 𝑣(𝑐2, 𝜂(𝑐1))]}
𝑐2
𝑐2
 𝑑𝐻2(𝑐2) 
 
[3.25] 
where 𝛿 is, as before, the discounted factor. On the other side, prospective entrant firm’s 
discounted profit is given by 
Π2(𝑐2, 𝐸(𝑐1)) = ∫ [𝛿𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹]𝑣(𝑐2, 𝜂(𝑐1)) 𝑑𝐻1(𝑐1)
𝑐1
𝑐1
 [3.26] 
where 𝐹 is the entry fixed cost.  
In this framework, a non-cooperative equilibrium is defined as a pair of strategies, 𝜂(𝑐1) 
for firm 1 and 𝑣(𝑐2, 𝜂(𝑐1)) for firm 2 such that neither firm can increase its profit by 
unilaterally altering its strategy (taking 𝐻1 and 𝐻2 as fixed). Thus, 
{𝜂∗(𝑐1), 𝑣
∗(𝑐2, 𝜂
∗(𝑐1))} is an equilibrium pair of strategies if: (a) for any 𝑐1 ∈ [𝑐1, 𝑐1] and 
any 𝜂(𝑐1) such that [𝑐1, 𝑐1] ⟶ ℝ+, 
𝜋1(𝜂
∗(𝑐1), 𝑐1) + 
+𝛿 ∫ {𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)𝑣
∗(𝑐2, 𝜂
∗(𝑐1)) + 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1)[1 − 𝑣
∗(𝑐2, 𝜂
∗(𝑐1))]}
𝑐2
𝑐2
 𝑑𝐻2(𝑐2) ≥ 
≥ 𝜋1(𝜂(𝑐1), 𝑐1) + 
+𝛿 ∫ {𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)𝑣
∗(𝑐2, 𝜂(𝑐1)) + 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1)[1 − 𝑣
∗(𝑐2, 𝜂(𝑐1))]}
𝑐2
𝑐2
 𝑑𝐻2(𝑐2) 
 
 
 
 
[3.27] 
 
                                                          
64 𝐻1 and 𝐻2, which are essentially firms’ beliefs of others’ marginal costs, incorporate the probability 
distribution of the different states of Nature. 
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and (b) for any 𝑐2 ∈ [𝑐2, 𝑐2] and any 𝑣(𝑐2, 𝜂
∗(𝑐1)) with domain [𝑐2, 𝑐2] × ℝ+ and range 
{0,1}, 
∫ [𝛿𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹]𝑣
∗(𝑐2, 𝜂
∗(𝑐1)) 𝑑𝐻1(𝑐1) ≥
𝑐1
𝑐1
≥ ∫ [𝛿𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹]𝑣(𝑐2, 𝜂
∗(𝑐1)) 𝑑𝐻1(𝑐1).
𝑐1
𝑐1
 
 
[3.28] 
 
 A numerical example 
First, a numerical example used by Milgrom and Roberts (1982) will clarify the working 
of the model. Let 𝑎 = 10, 𝑏 = 1, 𝑐1 = 0.5, 𝑐1 = 2, 𝑐2 = 1.5, 𝑐2 = 2, 𝛿 = 1 and 𝐹 = 7. 
Moreover, assume that the only possible values for 𝑐1 and 𝑐2 are {𝑐1, 𝑐1} and {𝑐2, 𝑐2} 
respectively. Finally, let ℎ2 the probability that 𝑐2 = 𝑐2 and let  ℎ1 be the probability that 
𝑐1 = 𝑐1. Then the following can be readily calculated: 
𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = 12.25 𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹 = −0.75 [3.29] 
𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = 13.44 𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹 = −2.31 [3.30] 
𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = 6.25 𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹 = 2 [3.31] 
𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = 7.11 𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹 = 0.11 [3.32] 
𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1) = 4.75 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1) = 22.56 [3.33] 
𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1) = 4 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1) = 16 [3.34] 
It is immediately evident from equations [3.29] through [3.32] that entry is unprofitable 
for entrant firm when the incumbent has a low marginal cost and profitable when firm 1 
has the high marginal cost.65 
                                                          
65 Therefore this case is similar to the one developed in the previous paragraph: the main difference lies on 
prospective entrant firm. In the simplified model, it is assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that the entrant 
has not specific type. The only assumption we made concerned its propensity to enter: indeed we assumed 
that 
1
2
(𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1) + 𝜋2
𝑑(𝑐1)) > 0. As a consequence, it entered the market surely when posterior probability 
equals prior probability; therefore no pooling equilibrium exists since entry cannot be deterred and at least 
one type of established firm strictly prefers to set monopoly output. This is exactly equilibrium strategy for 
low-cost firm 2. However, since in this model firm 2 can be high-cost firm, and in that case it would not 
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From this example, two different sorts of equilibria exist: a pooling equilibrium, at which 
𝜂∗(𝑐1) = 𝜂
∗(𝑐1), and a separating equilibrium, at which 𝜂
∗(𝑐1) ≠ 𝜂
∗(𝑐1). As already 
seen, at a separating equilibrium firm 2 can infer the correct value of 𝑐1 by observing 
established firm’s first period output choice; however this is impossible at a pooling 
equilibrium. 
At this point the analysis is focused in showing the existence of specific equilibria inside 
the set of possible equilibria. As described above, an equilibrium a mutual best response 
for both players given equilibrium strategy of the other, given a system of beliefs. 
Thus, let us demonstrate that the existence of a pooling equilibrium given by the following 
profile of pure strategies: 
𝜂∗(𝑐1) = 𝜂
∗(𝑐1) = 𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1) = 4.75 
𝑣∗(𝑐2, 𝜂
∗(𝑐1)) = 1 
𝑣∗(𝑐2, 𝑥1) = {
0  𝑖𝑓 𝑥1 ≥ 4.75
1    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
. 
 
 
[3.35] 
First note that at the pooling equilibrium, firm 2 decides to enter the market if it has the 
low marginal cost; however, if it has the high cost, if enters only if 𝑥1 < 4.75. In order to 
demonstrate that such strategies constitute an equilibrium, we have to find a system of 
beliefs that sustains such equilibrium, i.e. we have to find value for ℎ1 and ℎ2 for which 
𝜂∗  a best response to 𝑣∗ and vice-versa. Therefore expected profits for both firms are66 
Π1 = {
 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1) + 𝛿[𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1)ℎ2 + 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)(1 − ℎ2)]                   𝑖𝑓   𝑐1 = 𝑐1 
𝜋1
𝑚(𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1)) + 𝛿{𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1)ℎ2 + 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)(1 − ℎ2)}          𝑖𝑓 𝑐1 = 𝑐1
 
[3.36𝑎] 
[3.37𝑎] 
Π2 = {
[𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹]ℎ1 + [𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹](1 − ℎ1)  𝑖𝑓 𝑐2 = 𝑐2
0                                                                                      𝑖𝑓  𝑐2 = 𝑐2
 
[3.38𝑎] 
[3.39𝑎] 
 
                                                          
enter in the market, then a possibility of deterring entry acquire consistency, and a pooling equilibrium can 
be sustained by a system of beliefs. 
66 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1)) is high-cost type firm 1 profit when it set low-cost type monopoly output. Therefore, it is 
not as optimal condition for high-cost monopolist. 
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and substituting the real values we get for firm 1 
     Π1 = {
22.56(1 + ℎ2) + 12.25(1 − ℎ2)  𝑖𝑓   𝑐1 = 𝑐1
15.44(1 + ℎ2) + 6.25(1 − ℎ2)   𝑖𝑓   𝑐1 = 𝑐1
  
[3.36𝑏] 
[3.37𝑏] 
while for firm 2 
Π2 = {
2ℎ2 − 0.75(1 − ℎ1)       𝑖𝑓   𝑐2 = 𝑐2
0                                         𝑖𝑓  𝑐2 = 𝑐2
 
[3.38𝑏] 
[3.39𝑏] 
Thus, pooling strategies form an equilibrium if ℎ2 > 0.67 and 0.273 < ℎ1 < 0.953. 
Indeed, if firm 1 is a low-cost type equation [3.36𝑏] is optimal for every 0 ≤ ℎ2 ≤ 1, 
since there does not exist another first period quantity choice that gives a larger payoff; 
but if it has the high cost, equation [3.37𝑏] is best only if ℎ2 > 0.67, since it must be the 
case that 
𝜋1
𝑚(𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1)) + 𝛿{𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1)ℎ2 + 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)(1 − ℎ2)} >
> 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1) + 𝛿[𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)ℎ2 + 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)(1 − ℎ2)]. 
Similarly for firm 2, if it is a low-cost type [3.38𝑏] is best if ℎ1 > 0.273, since it is such 
that 2ℎ1 − 0.75(1 − ℎ1) > 0, while if it is a high cost type [3.39𝑏] is the best if ℎ1 <
0.953, since it is such that [𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹]ℎ1 + [𝜋2
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹](1 − ℎ1) < 0. 
By choosing 𝑥1 = 4.75 in first period, high-cost established firm engages in limit pricing 
when it has the high marginal cost. Indeed in that case,  𝑥1 > 𝑥1
𝑚 and therefore 𝑝(𝑥1) <
𝑝(𝑥1
𝑚). However, if firm 2 has the low marginal cost, the limit pricing has no effect on 
entry, but if  its marginal cost is high, limit pricing prevents entry. Thus, from the 
standpoint of firm 1, limit pricing is effective with probability ℎ1, and from the standpoint 
of firm 2, it is being subjected to limit pricing with probability ℎ2. 
Let us now demonstrate the existence of a separating equilibrium given by the following 
profile of pure strategies67: 
                                                          
67 Separating equilibrium quantity for low-cost firm is found as in the simplified model. Indeed, in order to 
separate, 𝜂∗(𝑐1) must be such that  𝜋1
𝑚
− 𝜋1(𝑝1) ≥ 𝛿(𝜋1
𝑚
− 𝜋1
𝑑
) and 𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1(𝑝1) ≤ 𝛿(𝜋1
𝑚 − 𝜋1
𝑑). 
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𝜂∗(𝑐1) = 7.2,          𝜂
∗(𝑐1) =  𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1) = 4,  
𝑣∗(𝑐2, 𝑥1) = {
1  𝑖𝑓 𝑥1 < 7.2
0  𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
. [3.40] 
First note that since 𝜂∗(𝑐1) is greater than low-cost monopoly output; hence 𝜂
∗ is a limit 
pricing strategy. In separating equilibrium, observing the equilibrium choice of 
established firm allows a precise and accurate inference to be made about firm’s 
characteristic. Hence 𝑣∗ is clearly a best response to firm 1’s equilibrium strategy: 
observing 𝜂∗(𝑐1) it recognizes the low value of firm 1’s marginal cost and therefore it 
does not enter; on the other side, observing 𝜂∗(𝑐1) it recognize that established firm is a 
high-cost type and therefore enters the market. Thus, we need to check that 𝜂∗ is 
effectively optimal given 𝑣∗. Note first that unless high-cost firm 1 produces 𝜂∗(𝑐1) it 
cannot deter entry. But  𝜂∗(𝑐1) is high enough that 𝜋1
𝑚
+ 𝛿𝜋1
𝑑
≥ 𝜋1(𝑝1) + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑚
, hence 
established firm finds it better to allow entry. On the other hand, if it produces a quantity 
lower than 𝜂∗(𝑐1), it is sure to face entry, and thus its best choice is to produce monopoly 
output; then  𝜂∗(𝑐1) =  𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1) is a optimal strategy for high-cost incumbent. If firm 1 is 
low-cost type, it has no reason to produce more than 𝜂∗(𝑐1). And if it would produce less, 
it surely face entry, and it will produce its monopoly quantity. But 𝜂∗(𝑐1) is such that 
𝜋1
𝑚 + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑑 ≤ 𝜋1(𝑝1) + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑚, then it prefers to set 𝜂∗(𝑐1) = 7.2; hence, this is the optimal 
strategy for low-cost established firm. 
Thus, in separating equilibrium expected profit for firm 1 is Π1 = 𝜋1
𝑚(𝜂∗(𝑐1)) +
𝛿𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1) = 39.12 if it is a low-cost firm, while if 𝑐1 = 𝑐1, 
Π1 = 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1) + 𝛿[𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)ℎ2 + 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)(1 − ℎ2)] = 22.25 + 7.11ℎ2. 
Firm 2 enters only if first period firm 1’s output is lower than 7.2, i.e. only if established 
firm has high cost, and it will get expected profit equal to 2ℎ1 for 𝑐2 = 𝑐2, and equal to 
0.11ℎ1 for 𝑐2 = 𝑐2. 
Here too, firm 1 sets limit pricing output part of the time: when it has a low cost. It does 
not fool prospective entrant firm. On the contrary, it signals its cost to firm 2, and firm 2 
                                                          
From the set of separating quantities, established firm will choose the amount closest to monopoly output, 
i.e. 𝜂∗(𝑐1) = 7.2. 
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stays out knowing that entry would be unprofitable. At the same time, the strategy 
followed by entrant firm makes cost-revealing strategy of firm 1 optimal for firm 1. 
A useful way to think about these results is to consider limit pricing as the outcome of 
competition between the types of established firm, with high cost types attempting to 
mimic low cost ones and low cost firms attempting to distinguish themselves from the 
high cost ones. Then, whether a pooling or a separating equilibrium is established, is a 
matter of whether it is a high or a low cost. 
 
 Limit pricing and separating equilibrium in continuous interval 
The numerical example described above shows situations in which the best for established 
firm is to accommodate entry, setting in the first period the simple profit maximizing 
output. Therefore this kind of strategy could arise with other specification too, and we are 
not able to identify the role of limit pricing behavior in this framework. However it can 
be shown that if there are a continuum of types (i.e. of cost levels) possible for established 
firms, and if firm 1’s equilibrium strategy is a strictly decreasing function in 𝑐1, then it is 
always better to set a limit pricing in face of a threat of entry. 
Suppose that the distribution of 𝑐𝑖 is given by a continuous probability density function 
ℎ𝑖(𝑐𝑖)   which is positive on [𝑐𝑖, 𝑐𝑖] and let us concentrate first on separating equilibria. 
Assume that entrant firm believes that established firm will play a certain strategy 𝑥1 =
?̃?(𝑐1). Since we are concentrating on separating equilibria, firm 2 can infer firm 1’s 
marginal cost through the output choice; indeed 𝑐1 = ?̃?
−1(𝑥1). Therefore prospective 
entrant firm will come into the market if and only if its expected profit 𝛿𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝐹, 
with 𝑐1 = ?̃?
−1(𝑥1), is positive. Let 𝑐2̿ be highest value of 𝑐2 that make entry profitable 
when 𝑐1 = ?̃?
−1(𝑥1); therefore it must be the case that 𝑐2 ≤ 𝑐2̿(𝑥1) ≡ 𝑔(?̃?
−1(𝑥1)).
68 If 
?̃?(𝑐1) is monotone decresing, as well as ?̃?
−1(𝑥1), then 𝑐2̿ is a singleton. Hence, in this 
case firm 2’s best response is given by 
𝑣(𝑐2, 𝑥1) = {
1       𝑖𝑓  𝑐2 ≤ 𝑐2̿(𝑥1)      
0          𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒            
. [3.41] 
                                                          
68 A necessary assumption in order to have a non-trivial problem is that 𝑐2̿ ∈ [𝑐2, 𝑐2]. Indeed if 𝑐2̿ < 𝑐2 
entry is always unprofitable, while if 𝑐2̿ > 𝑐2 entry cannot be deterred. 
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Now suppose that established firm believes that 𝑣 is of that general form, so that entry 
will be deterred if 𝑐2 exceeds some value ?̂?2(𝑥1). Then firm 1’s expected profit will be 
Π1 = 𝜋1
0(𝑐1, 𝑥1) + 
+𝛿 [∫ 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2)ℎ2(𝑐2) 𝑑𝑐2 + ∫ 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1, 𝑐2)ℎ2(𝑐2) 𝑑𝑐2
𝑐2
𝑐2̂(𝑥1)
𝑐2̂(𝑥1)
𝑐2
] 
 
[3.42] 
Where 𝜋1
0 refers to first-period profit for established firm. Maximizing with respect to 𝑥1 
we get 
𝜕𝜋1
0
𝜕𝑥1
− 𝛿ℎ2(?̂?2(𝑥1))?̂?′2(𝑥1){𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1, ?̂?2(𝑥1)) − 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, ?̂?2(𝑥1))} = 0. [3.43] 
Let 𝑅(𝑐1, 𝑐2) = 𝜋1
𝑚(𝑐1, 𝑐2) − 𝜋1
𝑐(𝑐1, 𝑐2) > 0 be firm 1’s reward from deterring entry. 
Then 
𝜕𝜋1
0
𝜕𝑥1
− 𝛿ℎ2(?̂?2(𝑥1))?̂?′2(𝑥1)𝑅(𝑐1, ?̂?2(𝑥1)) = 0 [3.44] 
must hold. But in equilibrium the conjectures must be correct, i.e. 𝑥1 = ?̃? = 𝜂
∗ and 
?̂?2(𝑥1) = 𝑐2̿(𝑥1) = 𝑔(𝜂
∗−1(𝑥1)), hence the following equality must hold 
𝜕𝜋1
0(𝑐1, 𝜂
∗(𝑐1))
𝜕𝑥1
−
𝛿𝑅(𝑐1, 𝑔(𝑐1))ℎ2(𝑔(𝑐1))𝑔′(𝑐1) 
𝜕𝜂∗ 𝜕⁄ 𝑐1
= 0. [3.45] 
Note that so long as 𝜂∗ is differentiable in 𝑐1, 
𝛿𝑅(𝑐1, 𝑔(𝑐1))ℎ2(𝑔(𝑐1))𝑔′(𝑐1) 
𝜕𝜂∗ 𝜕⁄ 𝑐1
< 0, [3.46] 
since 
𝜕𝜂∗
𝜕𝑐1
< 0 is negative by hypothesis, while all the other elements are positive; 
therefore the equality holds if and only if  
𝜕𝜋1
0
𝜕𝑥1
< 0. Thus, the simple monopoly solution 
𝑥1
𝑚 which is defined by 
𝜕𝜋1
0
𝜕𝑥1
= 0 cannot arise in equilibrium.69 Indeed, if the entrant were 
to believe that ?̃? = 𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1) responding optimally, then by a little increase in output 
                                                          
69 Note that the level of 𝑥1 : 
𝜕𝜋1
0
𝜕𝑥1
< 0 is greater than 𝑥1:
𝜕𝜋1
0
𝜕𝑥1
= 0 by the assumption that profit function is 
increasing and concave in output. Hence, firm 1 engages in limit pricing output. 
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𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1) + 𝜖 = ?̃?(𝑐
′
1) established firm can eliminate the threat of entry from firms in the 
interval of 𝑐2 ∈ (𝑔(𝑐
′
1), 𝑔(𝑐1)]. Indeed, with a continuum of possible types, is always 
possible to find an 𝜖 > 0 such that 
𝜋1(𝑥1
𝑚(𝑐1) + 𝜖) + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑚 > 𝜋1
𝑚 + 𝛿𝜋1
𝑐 . 
This means that the increase in first period output has a negative but negligible effect on 
first period profit, but a non-negligible positive effect on the total amount on expected 
profit due to the reward on deterring entry. 
Therefore in this model so long as (i) it is more profitable to be a monopolist than sharing 
the market, (ii) beliefs are given with positive probability, and (iii) higher costs for 
established firm encourage entry, firm must be limit pricing in a separating equilibrium. 
Finally, although we have concentrated on separating equilibria, pooling equilibria are 
conceptually possible in the continuum of types framework. In any pooling equilibrium, 
all established firm types are better off producing the equilibrium output 𝜂∗ than they are 
if they deviate from equilibrium and facing a different probability of entry related to the 
new output. This happens tipically when the deviation from 𝜂∗ induce an almost sure 
entry; then if high-cost type firms (with respect to the type related to 𝜂∗) are willing to 
produce 𝜂∗ a pooling equilibrium will be maintained.   
In conclusion, by modeling the decision making of both established firm and prospective 
entrant firm through a game of incomplete information, it has been shown two important 
results: first, it is in the interest of established firm to reduce price, i.e. to apply a limit 
pricing strategy, in order to deter entry; second, that equilibrium limit pricing does not 
necessarily limit entry.  
Indeed, in equilibrium potential entrants cannot be consistently fooled, or more precisely, 
their beliefs cannot be systematically biased. In this framework, limit pricing has an 
impact on the possibility of entry, but it is not always successful: the comparison is 
between the entry occurring in equilibrium limit pricing (and relative expected profit) and 
that which would occur if no limit pricing were to take place and prospective entrant firm 
were informed of this.  
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